THE NEW REPUBLIC

Kennedy on the Eve

James MacGregor Burns

Needed—A New Bipartisanship?

Selig S. Harrison

Civil Rights and the President

Alexander M. Bickel

The Day Britain Died

Patrick O'Donovan

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T.R.B. from Washington

Escape from Captivity

★ Maybe the reporters in the Kennedy party are suffering from group hypnosis. But the *New York Daily News* poll of New York state showing Kennedy ahead, the reversal of the Las Vegas betting odds in his favor, and other arcane and mysterious portents are having their effect. As reporters looked at the crowds, at enthusiastic local politicians and the fourth TV debate their own subconscious began sending in stronger and stronger signals. We were part of the process last week and watched the change take place with fascination. At the start of the week reporters had almost convinced themselves Kennedy was ahead; at the end they were certain of it.

We rejoined the Kennedy party after being away a month including an interval with Nixon. Most of the others had served time with Nixon, too. They were like men who had escaped from captivity – including the repetitious torture of the Nixon "basic" speech. Most loathsome passage was that bit about Sunday afternoon in Warsaw when 250,000 Poles came down to see him and Pat. Always those unfortunate Poles came bearing flowers, with tears down their cheeks (manly tremulo), and then he realized – ah yes, he realized what freedom meant to the Poles! America meant freedom to live their own lives – freedom to think (slower movement), freedom (pause) to worship God. (Crash of applause which slowly recalls Nixon from his rapt reverie from which he emerges with a dazed smile.)

Yes, if we say it ourself, it is quite an experience when 25 or 30 tough correspondents, relaxing on Press Bus No. 1 at midnight, bouncing to the airport for the next state, begin reciting this moving bit. One clear feminine voice leads the service while others, with a savage unction, insist on choice bits as of remembered wrongs. (The omission of "tears running down the cheeks" on one occasion produced a passionate storm of protest.)

Kennedy repeats himself, too, of course. Reporters sling their portables and start for the buses from the press tables when he begins the exit line, "Give me your help." But there is not the cloying, corny unction in Kennedy: there is a certain acerb, patrician aloofness about him that could not stomach it. Eisenhower's pietism seems genuine. One is never sure about Nixon's.

Kennedy's Self-Confidence

★ We were impressed by Kennedy's greater self-confidence on this trip. He seemed to have grown. One striking thing about him is the way he believes in himself. This may be good or bad, but it is enormously impressive. He has turned into a powerful campaigner. It would seem, too, that Kennedy has established his identity with the public, primarily through the TV debates. Nearly everyone criticizes his choppy gestures, his machine-gun delivery and yet they seem now to be recognized as trade marks that express the stark simplicity of his drive. Public political debates normally aid the challenger. They made Lincoln as against Douglas; Nixon as against incumbent Rep. Jerry Voorhis in 1946 and now Kennedy as against Nixon. We doubt if you'll see a repetition in 1964.

There could be no doubt of the public's curiosity after downtown New York's noon-hour outpouring for Kennedy last week. It was bigger than the New York crowds that Truman or FDR drew; it was the biggest this reporter has ever seen in a life-time of political reporting. What it meant nobody knows. In the skyscraper canyons the car-crushing, wall-to-wall crowd was inhuman and terrifying. People should not lose their identity like that. They stretched away like a moving, bobbing carpet of ants. Half a block ahead of the stalled press bus we could see the turbulence around the open car, and the familiar brown head in it while police fought for control and a kind of foam of hands tried to shake Kennedy's.

Kennedy's party lunched that day at the French restaurant just off the ice rink of Rockefeller Plaza. "The more I have seen and watched Nixon the more I want to win," observed the candidate after lunch, in a comment that came from the heart.

Catholics for Nixon

★ That night was the $100-a-plate charitable Al Smith memorial dinner at the huge Waldorf Astoria ballroom (built like an opera house, with a double row of boxes around three be-flowered sides). Kennedy and Nixon both spoke. A magnum of champagne stood at each table. Ropes of pearls were evident and Cardinal Spellman, in a medieval splash of scarlet, sitting between the two candidates, spoke suavely of the beneficence of God and of the quarter million dollars the single meal was expected to raise. There was no question to whom these wealthy Catholics gave their sympathy – the applause for Nixon was twice as loud as for Kennedy. Best speech of the evening came, surprisingly, from Mayor Wagner in a paraphrase of Al Smith including Smith's immortal comment on an opponent: "If bunk were electricity he'd be a powerhouse!"

For the press the most important event in the day came when the Kennedy and Nixon corps got together and compared notes. Washington veterans discovered that each party had severally come to the conclusion that Kennedy was advancing, Nixon trailing. This seemed to give more substance to the hunch but was still far from conclusive, particularly with one more big paroxysm of religious debate coming up on "Reformation Sunday" October 30.

Demagoguery on Cuba

★ With all sympathy for Kennedy we thought he sounded a jarring note when he advocated US aid for anti-Castro rebels. If Nixon had urged this we should have called it demagoguery, and we don't see why the same word doesn't apply to Kennedy. It is the sadder because his campaign has been relatively rational, we think, down to this point. Nor does it excuse him that Nixon, for all his pretended horror, followed the same line, advocating that we repeat in Cuba "what we did with Guatemala" (*i.e.*, a US-financed uprising).

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THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Helen Fuller, Managing Editor
Selig S. Harrison, Associate Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher
Contributing Editors:
Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Christopher Jencks, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

As a shiny blue sphere dubbed Courier IB rotates like a faithful watchdog around the earth, messages fed into it from the earth 600 miles below dart about its 300 pounds of electronic equipment and are relayed back to waiting listeners below. The signals are clear and the solar batteries have been operating admirably, but Washington – preoccupied with signals emanating from batteries of pollsters – may not be tuned in to Courier's message.

Courier, together with the 100-foot balloon satellite Echo, launched on August 12, and a whole host of satellites in progress, are the pioneers of a space communications system that will make possible instantaneous transmission of all forms of electronic communication – including telephone, telegraph and radio-TV signals. The success of these satellite discoveries has already raised baffling problems with which the government has scarcely begun to come to terms. One of the most pressing is which agency – the civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the military – should be responsible for future communications satellites which have clear commercial application. At the moment, the program is split in the most arbitrary way: NASA is in charge of developing "passive" satellites such as Echo, while the Army is in charge of "active" satellites of the Courier type. This division, presumably set up to determine which was the better satellite, is already breaking down as the civilian space agency prepares to move into the "active" communications satellite field with more advanced versions of Courier.

What is the difference? A "passive" satellite, such as the gas-filled Echo, is a relay station, bouncing radio signals off its reflective surface. Although passive systems demand more powerful transmitters and more sensitive receivers, they have the advantage of simplicity and reliability because the satellite itself contains no equipment which can malfunction in space. "Active" satellites such as Courier have intricate electronic innards which receive radio signals transmitted from earth, store them in their "brain" as they orbit the earth, and release them on command from a ground station.

Courier can receive and transmit some 370,000 words during a single 5-minute swipe over a ground station and will have an enormous impact on the transmission of teletype messages. The bigger, though less sophisticated, Echo can eventually make expensive underground telephone cables obsolete when incorporated into a celestial relay network. Courier is part of the Army's "Project Advent" which

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is expected, with the launching in 1963 of "stationary" satellites rotating around the equator at a speed equal to the earth's own rotation, to provide a global communications network capable of handling the military's international communications.

The military, whose millions of daily messages are clogging overcrowded teletype facilities, urgently needs a dependable communications network of its own. But what is sauce for the military may well be shekels for the communications industry. As is apparent to the most non-scientific layman, the same satellites that can form the nucleus of a military communications network can also revolutionize civilian communications.

Telephone calls, freed from reliance on underground cables or unreliable passes through the ionosphere, will be bounced off Echo satellites from continent to continent. International television, for better or worse, will move from the realm of feasibility to that of inevitability. The eternal silence of the spheres will be shattered by a million messages in a score of tongues as the Tower of Babel is blasted into outer space.

Washington's state of official innocence of these things to come was breached when T. Keith Glennan, head of the civilian space agency, loosed what can be termed a "trial balloon" just one week after the launching of Courier. He proposed that the government catapult private industry into the space age by offering to launch, at cost, communications satellites developed by private companies. The space agency should continue its own research and development efforts, he told a group in Portland, Oregon, "only so long as is necessary to assure that timely development of a commercially feasible communications system will be completed by private industry." Mr. Glennan's largesse was no doubt received with thanksgiving by officials of the major utility companies. At least one company, American Telephone and Telegraph, the world's largest utility, has for some time been awaiting just such a green light. Last July, AT&T sent a team to Washington to unveil a plan for launching AT&T's own fleet of earth satellites. AT&T officials urged an astonished Federal Communications Commission to set aside a broad band of radio frequencies for space signals, and proposed to set up its own satellite communications network. Fifty such satellites, costing $1 million each, plus another $65 million for ground installations, would figure out to only $25,000 per telephone circuit – cheaper than the most efficient underwater cable ever devised. Celestial phone calls, Bell engineers told the FCC, are the wave of the future – and incidentally will save AT&T a great deal of money. AT&T has now formally applied, last week, to the FCC for permission to launch an experimental satellite within a year for transmission of telephone calls, TV broadcasts and other types of communication between the US and Europe.

Neither the incredulous gentlemen on the FCC, nor the hard-working scientists at NASA and Army laboratories who put the satellites into orbit, nor the Departments of Commerce, State and Defense, which are going to demand a say in whatever happens, are really prepared to deal with the questions posed by the AT&T application. And this application is only the first knock on the door. Eventually, policymakers in half a dozen departments, in agencies and commissions, and eventually in Congress itself will have to make some firm decisions.

They will have to decide which radio frequency bands will be set aside for satellite signals and which agency will allocate the bands to whom. The FCC, improvising in an area quite outside its mandate, will have to act as arbiter in a competition for these potentially valuable bands. Present occupants (now using them for a variety of short-distance communications) will have to be shoved off and given room elsewhere.

Who is going to license commercial satellites if Bell and other companies are given the go-ahead to shoot off their own space vehicles? Will the government step in with subsidies – and if so, which agency will allocate and control them, and who will receive them?

Should private companies be allowed to develop a privately-run communications network – or should the federal government recoup some of its investment and retain control over its discoveries by holding on to ownership of all space satellites? Taxpayers have thus far invested some $25 billion in our military and civilian space program. NASA's budget of $500 million last year jumped to $915 million this year and will surely rise in the next few years. Should private companies be allowed the windfall gains of cashing in on the public's multi-billion dollar research project, just when its commercial applications are beginning to become clear?

Finally – although this scarcely exhausts the list of problems that are expanding in proportion to our ventures into space – does not the very nature of earth satellites, with their blissful oblivion to clashing ideologies and national borders, call for international agreement and international licensing, if not ownership, of space vehicles? Perhaps even Mr. Khrushchev could be persuaded that the avoidance of chaos in the practical exploitation of space will depend on a high degree of international cooperation.

Our scientists have performed brilliantly in their sphere, but the multiplying questions of public policy that Courier and Echo have laid upon our troubled terrestrial shoulders have moved out of the laboratories and onto the desks of the non-scientific executive, administrator and legislator. It is not jumping the gun to suggest that we must soon decide what we are going to do about those signals bouncing with such disconcerting regularity from the gleaming sides of our brand-new satellites.

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Who's Peddling Gloom?

The GOP and the GPO are at odds. As President Eisenhower, speaking at Abilene, was deploring "fear-mongering people who peddle gloom" and the Vice President's "white paper" was questioning the truth of Senator Kennedy's statement that America's economic growth rate was lower than that of the industrial countries of Western Europe, the presses at the Government Printing Office were grinding out the monthly Economic Indicators of the President's Council of Economic Advisers; and these indicate that, as of the moment, the US economy is not growing at all. Gross national product, between the second and the third quarter of 1960, declined by about $2 billion.

The Administration's word for this is "adjustment." But economic "adjustment" may be translated into political maladjustment, since a number of the areas worst affected are in states which are rich in electoral votes.

The Department of Labor classifies employment conditions in 150 major areas on a scale of A through F, with A representing a critical labor shortage (there has been none, in any area, for several years) and F representing unemployment of 12 percent or more of the labor force. This September, there were 16 B areas, where unemployment was less than three percent. In 92 areas, it ranged from three to six percent. But in 42 major areas, the D, E and F categories ranged from 6 percent up; they had enough "substantial labor surplus" to be entitled to preferential treatment under government procurement programs.

The Labor Department also classified 116 smaller areas as having a "substantial labor surplus."

In a further analysis, the Department has differentiated between areas where unemployment has developed rather recently because of the current shyness of consumers in purchasing such items as major appliances (their incomes have not gone down, but their savings have gone up) or because of government cutbacks in such items as aircraft, and those areas where difficulties are chronic. There are now 22 major areas, and 74 smaller ones, listed as having a "persistent" as well as a "substantial" labor surplus.

Where is the shoe pinching the worst?

Of the three major areas in which unemployment runs over 12 percent, two are in Puerto Rico; the third is the Wilkes-Barre-Hazelton region of Pennsylvania.

Of the six places where the labor surplus runs from six to 12 percent, three are also in Pennsylvania, two in West Virginia, one in Ohio.

Of the 33 with unemployment between six and nine percent, six are in Massachusetts, three each in Michigan, New Jersey and New York, two each in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania, and one each in 12 other states – including California, Texas, Pennsylvania – and Puerto Rico. Many of the smaller areas that are hurting are adjacent to the big ones.

As to immediate prospects, the Labor Department, if not "peddling gloom," is not peddling optimism; its forecasters see "no significant changes in over-all nonfarm employment totals during the next two months."

Most people continue to be well off; while there are 3.4 million without jobs, and another 1.3 million who are involuntarily working a short week, 67.8 million are at work. But an "adjustment" is certainly going on, and any realistic campaign discussion of growth rates must take current figures into account.

The Candidates on Cuba

The President evidently decided, early in July, that any further attempt to negotiate with the Castro regime was useless. His campaign against the Cuban Government since then has been consistent and energetic – and, so far, completely unsuccessful. The sugar-quota cut, the oil embargo, the attempt to isolate Cuba at the OAS conference in San José and Bogota goaded Castro into seizing one and a quarter billion dollars' worth of American property, provided grist for his busy propaganda mill, and have driven him further into the arms of the Soviet Union. Now the Administration, with strong urging from the Vice President, has played its last cards: the recommendation that US civilians get out of Cuba, the embargo on all exports except food and medicine, and the withdrawal of Ambassador Bonsal from Havana for an indefinite period. Short of a naval blockade, assassination or direct military intervention there is nothing left for us to do.

These latest measures are not likely to be any more effective in bringing down Castro than the earlier ones. Cuba has been cutting imports from the US ever since the new government came to power; our shipments to the island this August were only $18 million, as against $42 million during the same month in 1958. Cuba may have some difficulty in keeping American-made trucks, tractors and sugar-mill machinery going, but the Cubans have been stockpiling spare parts for months. After the uproar over the Declaration of San José, the State Department has not even dared to ask Latin American nations to join us in banning shipments to Cuba, and Canada's Prime Minister Diefenbaker has already announced that his government "has no intention whatsoever" of supporting the American embargo. In any emergency, Castro can count on aid from the USSR, which proved its ability to move swiftly and efficiently during the oil crisis. "Che" Guevara is now enroute to Moscow to negotiate the sale of next year's sugar crop, and *Pravda* has reiterated the Soviet Union's economic and military support of the Castro

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regime. Kennedy's initial response to this latest turn of events was deeply disappointing. His imprecise suggestion that we "attempt to strengthen . . . anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself," so that they can overthrow the government, implies, as Mr. Nixon correctly points out, a violation of the UN charter, of the charter of the OAS, and of elementary rules of prudence. Nor did Mr. Kennedy explain how he hoped to cut off Cuba's trade with other countries. Nixon caught him up on these points in the fourth TV debate, and he clearly hopes to make decisive last-minute capital of the issue. But his own position is hardly impregnable. Talk of telegraphing punches! "We can do what we did with Guatemala," he said. "We quarantined Mr. Arbenz. The result was that the Guatemalan people themselves eventually rose up and they threw him out." If Mr. Nixon thinks this happened without substantial, though covert, US aid, he is one of the few officials in this hemisphere who so believes. Indeed, in the '56 campaign, the Republicans took credit for our part in the overthrow of Arbenz. And the Vice President's further remark that the easy, though irresponsible way, of getting rid of Castro would be to send in the Marines, and that it could be done in 24 hours, fantastically underestimates the will and the capacity of the Cubans to defend their regime against foreign intervention.

Sooner or later, the next President will have to obey the old German maxim and "bite into the sour apple," *i.e.*, resume attempts to negotiate.

More Brinkmanship

Mr. Nixon made three statements to the American Legion convention, each of which qualifies him for the adjective he has pinned on his opponent – "sophomoric." First, he told the Legionnaires that, "Seven and a half years ago we were in a war in Korea. A war that we were not allowed to win. A war that was tying down and killing thousands of American boys. Under the leadership of President Eisenhower . . . that war has been ended."

What are the facts? There were three wars in Korea, and the United States was involved in two of them. There were the first few days when North Koreans were clobbering South Koreans. The forces of the United Nations, most of which were American (the Vice President did not refer to the UN; it is as if the UN had no part in the struggle), entered the war on the side of the South Koreans and after bitter combat pushed the North Koreans back to where they were at the beginning, even beyond. That war was won.

There followed a third war, in which the forces of the United Nations fought both the North Koreans and Communist Chinese "volunteers." The question then had to be decided: Should the United States, alone or with the help of any others who might go along, engage in a fourth war – a major war between this country and Communist China, fought on the Chinese mainland? This was the course presumably advocated by General MacArthur and repudiated by Mr. Truman. Had we become involved in this fourth war, there is considerable question whether it could have been "won" in the sense that Mr. Nixon uses that word. In the nuclear age, and this Mr. Nixon seems unable to understand, there is one kind of victory, which, if one insists on having it, means defeat, for it means a nuclear holocaust. If Mr. Nixon meant to say that this country should have waged a total war against Communist China (and perhaps, as a consequence, with the USSR as well) he should have said that. He does not, of course, dare say that, nor does he probably mean it.

The success of any policy of deterrence rests on a capacity to avoid, to deter conflict, and – where conflict is inevitable – to be willing to "win" short of losing everything. Our entire military strategy is calculated to prevent or at least confine conflicts, not to broaden them, not to raise them to the level of nuclear war. If Mr. Nixon does not appreciate this, he is a dangerous man.

The Vice President's second point was equally misleading and illustrates unexpected ignorance of modern strategy. He referred to the necessity of increasing our defense "so that America's deterrent will be . . . absolute and unattackable." The Vice President has sat in on enough meetings of the National Security Council so that he should know that no authority in military matters would ever dream of using the phrase. The only "absolute" deterrent would be one that is absolutely invulnerable to attack by an adversary, or absolutely irresistible on the other side. But there is no such thing. By its very nature, deterrence is relative; vulnerability to attack is relative. The uneasy peace that we have today has rested in large part upon what is called "the balance of terror," not upon the absoluteness of the power of one side or the other.

Mr. Nixon's third point was a recommendation that the next President consider using our veto power in the Security Council to prevent the admission of the Communist Chinese to the UN. Admittedly, the remark was made to the American Legion; it was lollipops for the kids. But anyone running for the Presidency has a responsibility to speak in some harmony with the facts. As Senator J. W. Fulbright has pointed out, the question of Chinese membership would be "procedural" according to Security Council ground rules and thus not even subject to a US veto. Mr. Nixon might have taken the trouble to consult with his own Vice Presidential candidate, who assured a nationwide TV audience a week earlier that there was no conceivable chance that Communist China would be admitted to the United Nations over our objection, since the US

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could always muster what he called "a blocking third" in the General Assembly. That boast may have been tactless, but it is nothing as compared to Nixon's brandishing the weapon of veto, a threat this country and others have found so repellent when made by Russia.

Chiang and His Critics

Dictatorships being dictatorships, few in the West were surprised when a military court in Formosa on October 8 sentenced Lei Chen, editor of the *Free China Fortnightly*, to 10 years' imprisonment. Lei Chen had persistently criticized the Nationalist dictatorship, but his real crime was to raise a mild question or two about the assumptions of Nationalist foreign policy. Translations of the now defunct *Fortnightly* and of the official indictment against Lei make revealing reading against the background of the current Quemoy-Matsu debates.

Lei Chen's "ultimate purpose," charges the indictment, "is to overthrow the government by means of writings favorable to the Communist rebels." As proof that he "colluded with Communist agents and engaged in pro-Communist propaganda," the indictment offers the devastating fact that the *Fortnightly* had "falsely accused the government in its policy of recovery of the mainland as deceiving both itself and others," and that still worse, at the time of the shelling of the offshore islands in August, 1958, had "insisted that the battle of the offshore islands was a local operation . . . that the Communists had no intention of invading Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores) at all, in spite of their clamoring to the contrary. Further, it voiced the view that the gravity of the fighting had been shifted from the military field to the diplomatic field and that since the free world was afraid of a nuclear war, the general situation was not favorable to China over the question of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu."

The Nationalist indictment does not do a bad job of paraphrasing what Lei actually said. "The idea of recovery of the mainland," he had written on September 1, 1957, "is frequently posited on the assumption that there will be a 'future world war' and that the future world war is visualized as a shooting war. But modern warfare is not necessarily a shooting one, and any plan for return-to-mainland which is contingent on a general shooting war needs further re-examination." On the offshore islands, the *Fortnightly* had stressed that "the Communist attacks on Kinmen and Matsu are designed to achieve political ends rather than military. Thus the government should maintain calm in dealing with the crisis; otherwise, the social and economic life of Taiwan will suffer from the panic, without the ability to withstand a real crisis."

From the standpoint of the United States, the most

harmful aspect of the Lei case may lie in the fact that the Chiang Government does rely on a perpetual state of tension with Peking as a means for maintaining its internal control on Formosa and that this does, as Lei suggested, weaken the capacity for effective resistance in the event of renewed subversive or military offensives by Peking. The US has hoped for the growth of a politically stable regime in which the base of popular support steadily broadens, and in which voices such as Lei's give support to our own efforts for a withdrawal from the untenable commitment to the offshore islands. That hope grows dimmer. Chiang can be expected to promote a rash of scare stories about demoralization within his forces and about Communist efforts to engineer a deal with "unreliable" Nationalists for a reunion of Formosa with the motherland. And these stories of Nationalist-Communist feelers may prove as useful in coercing Washington to follow Chiang's lead as comparable stories of Japanese-Nationalist negotiations during World War II.

Talking to New Nations

In the General Assembly meetings in New York, words such as Cold War, Colonialism, Neutralism, Peace, Left-Wing have not only been employed as propaganda missiles, which is normal, but have been unintention-

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ally misused, so that they have meant different things to different delegates.

In the course of the Assembly's debate on considering the admission of Communist China to the UN, for example, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth argued that Peking could not be admitted because that regime had been imposed on the Chinese people by military force. The Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, countered that the same argument could be used against the United States, and he hoped no American schoolboy would read Wadsworth's speech.

But, said Ambassador Wadsworth in reply: "The whole world knows that the Government of the United States was not imposed by force upon the American people. It was demanded by the people and created by the freely elected representatives of the people, who had learned the rights of free men from their English forebears and from their other forebears, many of whom came from other countries."

Mr. Wadsworth did not, of course, intend to imply any condemnation of those many member-states which exist as a result of revolution, or to suggest that these nations are in some way illegitimate. But that is what he seemed to be saying to some, and Krishna Menon returned to the point, reminding the Assembly that Wadsworth's argument against admitting Communist China was something new, since "the US has at no time been the advocate of the concept of legitimacy – whether it was a question of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or of Frederick Barbarossa." He added that in the US, "the constitutional processes whereby the consent of the people was obtained came after the assertion of force and the establishment of power." The Indian then invited his colleagues to read the Declaration of Independence. "Legitimism," he said, "cannot be defended, and if you object to revolutionary governments, then you simply argue against the whole of progress."

The interchange was not reported in the newspapers, but it helps to explain how potential friends can be alienated, and needlessly. This country's claim to the goodwill of many new nations rests less on Point Four programs than on the fact that our origin *is* revolutionary and anti-colonial. We cannot hope to be understood by Asia and Africa when we seem to turn our backs on our past. To do so not only contributes to the failure of communication at the UN; it is bad politics.

Someone's Slip Is Showing

No one may say who is in charge of fabricating the fairy tales that are published from time to time to explain why some American has been caught taking photographs in the Soviet Union. Perhaps Walt Disney. It didn't take more than 48 hours for the camouflage that had been wrapped around Mr. Powers' U-2 flight to fall apart – no, the plane was not gathering weather data. And now we have the story of two young men, Harvey Bennett and Mark Kaminsky, who have just been kicked out of the Soviet Union, and who, the State Department announces, were "bona fide tourists."

Assuming that all Russians are deaf, dumb and blind, was it wise to expect them to take at face value the explanation these Americans gave for their mission to Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, Kharkhov, Kiev and Uzhgorov? What they told reporters was that Mr. Kaminsky, a graduate student at the University of Michigan, had gone to gather material for a book he proposed to write, but for which he had no publisher, entitled "Soviets Talk About Peace and Prepare for War." What Mr. Bennett was doing was not reported. He was identified simply as unemployed, but having a wife and three children in California.

They were enabled to visit the Soviet Union, they said, by a grant of $2,000 from the Northcraft Educational Fund of Philadelphia, the whereabouts of which is as mysterious as the rest of the story. Any Russian with access to a Philadelphia telephone directory would have had a hard time locating that Fund; no telephone is listed under its name; the Internal Revenue Service says Northcraft is not a tax exempt educational organization.

Moreover, some minor functionary of the Soviet secret police might also have done some arithmetic, adding up the cost of the trip the young men took and subtracting it from $2,000. They rented a car in Finland and drove into and around the USSR. Two round-trip tourist plane fares to Helsinki (tourist) is $1,314. The customary cost per day for accommodations in the Soviet Union is $30 – $60 for two. Considering their extensive itinerary, a stay of 30 days would appear minimum – that comes to $1,800. Car rentals run about $10 a day, or $300 for 30 days. And there might have been some incidental expenses, say for film (they took quite a few pictures, which were confiscated).

After having sentenced Mr. Kaminsky to seven years imprisonment for espionage, the Russians decided to send him and Mr. Bennett packing. They are now back home. Why this unusual act of clemency? Were the Russians incapable of taking the episode seriously? Is there a Soviet sense of humor?

It would be interesting to have the view of US intelligence experts on the point Drew Pearson made last week – that when "the CIA injects its operations into the tourist and people-to-people program it puts other legitimate tourists under suspicion and jeopardizes one of the few successful programs for peace." It would be interesting, too, to know how far our intelligence agencies are prepared to go in compromising the standing of bonafide American philanthropic foundations by using them as cover for espionage.

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If We Can Only Stay Awake

The Cuban embargo is regrettable in the extreme, but what else could Eisenhower be expected to do? For a General it was, in fact, moderate action; a General's first impulse, in such circumstances, is to send in the Marines, and Eisenhower deserves credit for having thus far resisted that impulse.

Nevertheless, we are in the unenviable position of applying the economic lash to the Cuban people for the misdeeds of their leader. We may therefore expect another wave of anti-American sentiment everywhere south of the Rio Grande; and Moscow will certainly do its best to take advantage of it.

The success of the Russian effort will depend very largely on the wisdom and skill of our representatives in the capitals south of the border, and their position is delicate. There is a Presidential campaign on in this country. Suppose our man in any Latin American capital reports evidence of rapid Communist infiltration – will he not come under suspicion of being an agent of the Democrats, if not of the Communists?

Our foreign service has not forgotten McCarthy. That name has seared upon its memory as with a red-hot branding iron a warning against telling Washington any unpleasant truth. Aside from that, in a Presidential campaign the bringer of bad news inevitably incurs the resentment of politicians. It takes an exceptionally bold and honest man to send in reports that the opposition will instantly convert into campaign thunder. We shall be fortunate beyond our deserts if we are kept truthfully informed of the advance of Communism south of the border.

Just how many other regimes between Mexico and the Horn are actually as rickety as Batista's was when we were being told that he had the situation well in hand? None, we hope. But, after Cuba, do we dare say that we know? If true information is coming in, is it being competently appraised in Washington? We know, now, that reasonably accurate reports had come in before the Vice President made his ill-fated tour of South America; but they could not have been accurately evaluated or Mr. Nixon would never have thrust his head into the hornets' nest.

The effects of eight years of inanition in Washington cannot be erased in a day. The Cuban affair proves that the American people do not know where they stand in relation to Latin America. It is to be hoped that the trouble-spots are relatively few and small, but we do not know and we cannot feel sure as long as we have in Washington an Administration that is either ill-informed, or that shuts its eyes to unpleasant fact. "Troy fell because Cassandra was not believed."

The loss to Communism of any considerable part of Latin America would present a clear and present military danger to this country, but it would do worse than that – it would invalidate any claim of ours to leadership of the free world. It would destroy forever the old image of America as the Land of Promise behind the Golden Door.

But have we not asked for it? With the leadership of half the world not merely proffered us, thrust upon us, we have produced not one new idea in eight years. "The bird that can sing and won't sing must be made to sing," says the old proverb; but in the case of nations the one that could lead but doesn't lead will not long retain leadership.

Khrushchev thinks that time is working for him, which is doubtful; but witlessness and indolence are certainly working for him. They have brought his power within ninety miles of American soil, and how much further they have carried it in the Southern continent we simply do not know.

But what we do know is that the second officer of the United States government was almost lynched in South America and that the apparition of Castro is before our eyes. Those facts are certainly no evidence of high prestige.

How long it will take us to recover the lost ground is any man's guess; but we shall never recover it as long as we refuse to admit that any ground has been lost. The policy of "containment" reached its furthest limit in Korea. That affair permanently discouraged the idea of a military attack; but the assumption that a military attack is the only recourse available to Communism was a gross error, and dearly are we now paying for it.

"Yet a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep." What a foreign policy for a great power, a presumptive leader of half the world! But it will be the policy unless and until an aroused public opinion demands activity and votes into office a leader who can and will stay awake even though the bugles are not calling armed men to assemble.

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ADENAUER'S ALARM OVER DE GAULLE'S EUROPEAN POLICY

Discord Between Bonn and Paris

Bonn

The most significant Franco-German meeting of the last six years took place in Bonn earlier this month when the French Prime Minister, M. Debré, and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, reviewed the political, military and economic organization of the Western Alliance in Europe. Since the Federal Republic came into being in 1949, no Franco-German discussions have been so barren of accomplishment.

M. Debré arrived in Bonn jaunty, debonair, yet almost certainly with some inward misgivings. Like any other Western statesman he knows what immense worth Chancellor Adenauer attaches to the Franco-German entente and to the military security of Western Germany as an integral part of the Western Alliance. The last two Federal Elections, in 1953 and 1957, were fought and won on a Christian Democratic ticket of "our security and no experiments at home or abroad." Dr. Adenauer has never ceased stressing the mighty role of the United States in maintaining the independence and freedom of Western Europe. He knows (no thinking West European doubts it) that the defense of Western Europe hinges on American political, military and moral aid. And since NATO has been the most essential means for marrying American goodwill and material help to Western Europe's struggle for survival, Adenauer has never made any secret of his desire to give NATO greater political and moral standing.

The French performance as a NATO partner has never inspired confidence and has lately become alarming. General de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO. He refused to allow US aircraft, equipped to carry nuclear weapons, to be stationed in France. He siphoned-off French troops for service in Algeria, while failing to reinforce absurdly under-strength contingents in Germany. He aired the view that NATO forces in Europe should be commended by a Frenchman, not an American. He gave every evidence of demanding that France should be given the military leadership in Europe, without needing to honor her military commitments there.

All this was made plain to Dr. Adenauer when he visited de Gaulle in Rambouillet in the summer. It appears that the Federal Chancellor utterly failed to raise objections then, and may even have taken that least statesmanlike of views – that "things would blow over" and that de Gaulle would change his mind. The reverse happened. M. Debré came to Bonn on October 8 with a blueprint for European reorganization, containing the following demands: NATO should be directed by a "triumvirate" of the United States, France and Britain. France should be given some form of veto on the use of the nuclear deterrent in Europe (almost certainly, the blueprint revived the old plan of France as an independent nuclear power, taking the German Federal Republic under her wing). Existing plans for a supranational European Community should be scrapped, and the de Gaulle design of a Confederation of "Europe of the Fatherlands" substituted.

In order to back these new demands, General de Gaulle made a series of speeches – at Grenoble, St. Julien-en-Genevois and Chambery – while M. Debré was still closeted in Bonn with the Federal Chancellor. In all three speeches he selected the French veto on the use of the nuclear deterrent as the "operative" theme, intended to exemplify the broader aspects of his military policy – a predominant French voice in the European theater and French leadership of NATO in Europe.

It was at this point, on October 9, that Adenauer's patience cracked. The Chancellor had been ready to barter Germany's claim to the Saar, to wink at France's failure to fulfill her NATO commitment in Germany, to observe a discreet silence on the Algerian War, and to ignore politely General de Gaulle's assertion that the Oder-Neisse line constituted a final eastern frontier for Germany. But the new French blueprint was laid before him without warning or prior consultation, and General de Gaulle's series of speeches could only have been designed to force the Chancellor's hand (he received an incorrect transcript of one of them, made at Grenoble, while actually in conference with M. Debré).

With his usual prescience, Adenauer had armed himself with a valuable document before he sat down to talk to M. Debré. This was a letter from President Eisenhower, expressing the view that the Western Alliance should be strengthened militarily and politically, and that the presence of American troops in Europe was partly dependent on Europe's own ability to organize and integrate itself. The tone of the letter was exactly in line with Adenauer's own views (he may well have asked Eisenhower for it!). It enabled him to stress the paramount necessity for American forces in Europe (the idea of French military leadership of Euro-

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pean forces shorn of American troops and weapons is, of course, ludicrous). It enabled him to reject the de Gaulle blueprint out-of-hand. The joint communique issued on October 9 contained not one single concrete point of agreement between the two governments.

M. Debré returned smilingly to Paris. Dr. Adenauer reflected on his newly-improved understanding with Britain – carefully contrived by allowing Britain to sponsor German interests at the United Nations. In Paris the former French High Commissioner and Ambassador to the Federal Republic, M. François-Poncet, uttered a terrible warning. The Franco-German entente, he said, was the biggest accomplishment in Europe since 1945, and "Woe to them who may be responsible for nullifying this achievement!"

It is too soon to talk of a realignment of political forces in Western Europe. More important, it is inadvisable to do so. An Anglo-German flirtation can in no event supersede the Franco-German *mariage de convenance*. But Anglo-German understanding may be useful in inducing General de Gaulle to do some desperately needed rethinking. France has been allowed to dominate the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the European Common Market, but the idea of French military hegemony in Western Europe is pure moonshine.

The fact that now the West German camp-follower has at long last mutinied may drive General de Gaulle into reassessing the true meaning of partnership. In the face of mounting Communist pressures, and the present peril to Berlin in particular, a free Europe can only survive by maintaining unity of purpose. When Dr. Adenauer meets General de Gaulle – as he is virtually certain to do some time before Christmas – that unity will have one of its most severe tests.

Terence Prittie

WILL THERE BE ANOTHER CUBA IN THE CARIBBEAN?

The Coming Coup in Haiti

Port-au-Prince

We heard her scream and found her, a terrified elderly Negro schoolteacher from Ohio, on the road near a night trader's candle-lit stand. Stranded 15 miles from Port-au-Prince, she had unwillingly surrendered her car and driver to a unit of police. Next day, I learned that a soldier had roughly shoved her traveling companion off the long sidewalk fronting the Presidential Palace. Understandably, they were on the next flight to Puerto Rico.

"Stupidity, incredible stupidity," said a Haitian friend. "The government cannot even maintain the barest amenities toward tourists."

In probably no other country do the secret police (the professional terrorists in their ranks are nicknamed *cagoulards*, the hooded ones) outnumber the army. Over 5,000 strong, they are everywhere in Haiti – in the taxis, hotels, markets and stores. Nothing, no one, escapes their surveillance. The free press, the free unions, the independent student organizations, all of them have been smashed by the regime of Dr. François Duvalier. Some time ago, *Haiti-Miroir* and *Independence* were suppressed, their editors jailed or exiled. Last August 8, the police's full-time thugs reportedly beat to death the editor of the weekly, *La Lutte*. His crime? A sensitive report contrasting the poverty of the Kenscoff peasants with the summer villas of the newly-rich government functionaries going up nearby.

The secret list of President Duvalier's victims carefully preserved by Haiti's underground opposition lengthens daily. One oppositionist, a high official in the old Paul Magloire government, told me that since Duvalier's *coup* (masquerading as an election) on September 22, 1957, there have been over 300 known killings. Hundreds more have been beaten, jailed, or taken from their homes never to be heard from again.

Nor has the President ignored Haiti's thousands of political exiles in Central America and the United States. The regime reportedly pays out nearly $20 million annually to its international spies and informants. This is roughly two-thirds of Haiti's annual earnings from coffee, its chief export.

For over two years, the Duvalier regime has not had to account for one *gourde* of public expenditure. So low that the government's August payroll was met by a special $1 million loan from the United States, the Haitian treasury is fair game for customs inspectors, influence peddlers and government functionaries of all kinds. (An importer must count on paying roughly

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double the legal duty; since customs account for more than 70 percent of total government revenue, the opportunities for a broad-minded official are limitless.) "Duvalier is said to be personally an honest man," a Haitian businessman told me. "But he is a fool, and Haiti is too poor to endure an honest fool much longer." A number of international loans have vanished as mysteriously as the residents of Port-au-Prince disappear from the downtown streets at night. No one seems to know what became of $4 million from Cuba in 1957, or the $4 million from the Dominican Republic in '58.

The total outlay for the only really well-paved road in the capital city is a popular guessing game in Port-au-Prince. Only two kilometers long, its cost is variously estimated at from $1 million to $2 million. Taxes? Armed with two sets of books and a banknote, the Haitian businessman need have no concern. The country's peasant-proprietors are not so adept at avoiding the law; land taxes are small, but market levies consume a sizable proportion of their small incomes.

On the one hand, the pattern of Haitian economic development (or lack of it) has deprived the island of a strong and viable middle-class. On the other hand, the distribution of land into small parcels worked by isolated peasant producers, together with the lack of industry which prevents the development of an urban working class, have thwarted the rise of an economic class able to fashion a genuine social revolution. No bourgeoisie, no *latifundia*, no industry – accordingly, there is in Haiti no economic class strong enough to take and hold political power. Political questions then are questions of personality, or color (this figured importantly in Duvalier's rise to power). The only meaningful politics are the politics of exile.

Ninety percent of Haiti's population are small peasant proprietors. No fact about the island is as significant as this. Because they are so socially backward, so poor, so ignorant, so conservative, their role in politics is a passive one. Their religion, voodoo, compels them to accept a manual of superstitions (on birth control, marriage, literacy, farming techniques) unique in Latin America; their "property" (in the absence of primogeniture, land holdings get smaller each generation), a political conservatism; their physical isolation and language (they speak creole, while the country's newspapers, magazines and most broadcasts are in French), an all-pervading ignorance. There are no large Haitian plantations, hence no satellite industries to service the *latifundia*. Agricultural products are processed abroad.

At every turn, these peasant proprietors are exploited – by the tax system, by the lawyers, by the money lenders (who often demand land itself as interest payment), by the country thieves from whom the police offer little protection. From bitter experience, they know that any crop surplus accompanying the introduction of new productive techniques will likely be stolen. Yet the peasants have no sense of class, of unity.

Between the peasants and the urban workers there is little or no contact. The latter, a tiny minority, are nearly as politically isolated as the peasants. Most of them are servants, street traders, porters, dock laborers. All free unions (even those closer to employers' associations, like the Chauffeurs' Association) have been transformed into instruments of the government. In 1954, 56 independent unions claiming a total membership of 7,000 workers were recognized. All of them have been dissolved, the last in September, 1958. Honest union leaders have been purged, and in Haiti this means they have been murdered or exiled. The urban workers too are exploited; most live in one-room shacks renting from $3 monthly up. Low rents, to be sure; however, contractors build them for $15 to $20 each.

The elite (the middle-class) sustains itself by usury and – for the honest minority – trade. Mainly light colored in the South and dark in the North, many pay their servants (some of whom were purchased on the Port-au-Prince docks in 1954 after Hurricane Hazel forced Southern peasants to sell their offspring to keep them from starvation) in food, clothes and security. "In case of revolution," a well-to-do Haitian said, "we simply raise our servants' wages a few *gourdes* a month."

Purely opportunistic in nature, the government is presumptively left-wing, having risen to power on a radical program. The semi-literate government functionaries drawn from the urban masses still parrot the official line. "Our only opposition is the bourgeoisie," an immigration inspector told me. "And they are against us because we have cut off their income from contraband." The middle-class does oppose Duvalier at present, for business is poor, trade is stagnant, incomes are falling, the economy is slowly deteriorating. So do non-Communist intellectuals (excepting the professional class) and the independent students. (The main student federation is literally a branch of the government and it can be counted upon to back any given government policy.) The more aware elements of the urban working-class are similarly anti-government, as is some of the Roman Catholic hierarchy – Duvalier has consistently favored non-Catholics, particularly the Methodists who have promised to staff their posts with black ministers, which the Catholics have failed to do.

This is Duvalier's opposition, a potpourri of isolated and conflicting groups. And yet few Haitians expect the current regime to last much longer. Led by the independent intellectuals and discontented elements in the middle-class, supported by the Catholic Church and the terrorized urban unemployed, a *coup* is in the making. The Army, as always, will tip the scales. Whoever wins its support will be victorious.

JAMES O'CONNOR

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Osborn Views The Campaign



Am I worthy of the office... Yes! Pat & the girls & Mamie & Mother think that I am.... the base is solid but now we'll build on it... I say this, I made lots of statesman-like decissions until Eisenhower couldn't remember them.... I seem to be perspiring in here, its probably rigged... Make him up for this one so he doesn't look like a dishonest undertaker... Would you have our Chief apologize to Khrushchev?.... I won't yield anything anywhere to anybody.... Do you want Commies running the U.S.A?.... etc. etc.

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JOHN F. KENNEDY

Candidate on the Eve: Liberalism Without Tears

by James MacGregor Burns

Two years ago, when I began a full-scale study of John Kennedy as a Presidential aspirant, I knew him to be a superb campaigner, a wholly engaging person, and a solid supporter of the Roosevelt-Truman economic policies, but I was uncertain about the scope, intensity and durability of his liberalism. Clearly he wanted bread-and-butter liberalism, but on our great moral heritage of civil liberties and civil rights his position was not so clear to me.

A year ago, on finishing that study, I concluded that he had moved into a position of solid intellectual and political commitment to liberalism in its broadest terms, including civil liberties and civil rights. The haunting question remained: could he summon zeal and warmth and emotional commitment in defense of the positions he seemed to have arrived at through wholly cerebral processes? To the struggle for American survival Kennedy would bring bravery and wisdom, I felt, but whether he would bring passion and power would depend on his making a commitment not only of mind but of heart.

Today, on the eve of America's great choice, I believe that Kennedy in his campaign has deliberately prepared the way for the most consistently and comprehensively liberal Administration in the history of the country. Whether in the end he will, if elected, produce such an Administration is another question turning on the nature of the next Congress, events abroad, and other factors. But of Kennedy's absolute determination to stand behind liberal policies, I have no question.

For he has shown that determination in the sternest test a politician can face – the crucible of a Presidential campaign. As in all campaigns, there have been many advisers within the party as well as outside urging Kennedy to soften his line, to make concessions. He has not heeded this advice. Quite deliberately he has followed the Roosevelt-Truman-Stevenson tradition in the party, and where he has departed from his predecessors it has been to take a stronger line rather than a weaker one, as in the case of medical care, aid to education, and civil rights.

A politician's beliefs can be tested by two measures – by what he says, and by the kind of people he gathers around him. On both these scores Kennedy has come through with very high marks.

Consider the Democratic platform. Kennedy's strength in the convention last July was such that he directly and indirectly dominated the writing of the platform. It is his program. Moreover, the Kennedy forces were so sure several weeks before the convention of winning the nomination that they were in a position to shape the platform to the needs less of a convention victory than of a final election victory. The fact that Kennedy demanded and received an emphatically liberal platform as the basis for his Presidential campaign is proof that he considers liberalism both politically wise and morally essential. It is instructive to compare, in this regard, the enormous concessions that Franklin Roosevelt made to conservatism when campaigning during the depression in 1932. And if Kennedy considers liberalism to be good politics for winning the Presidency, he would also consider it to be good politics in administering the Presidency, especially with Nelson Rockefeller looming as the most likely Republican candidate in 1964.

Perhaps an even better test of the durability of Kennedy's liberalism is the type of men he has gathered around him. As in the case of FDR, they are of two basic types – men of thought who advise him on policy and men of action who conduct the practical work of vote-getting. Also as in the case of Roosevelt, the men of thought have the decisive impact on policies and the men of action have the larger role in electioneering. Although one of the unique and impressive aspects of Kennedy's group is that the men of thought are also men of action, the crucial point is that the campaign technicians are not modifying policy to meet the needs of some special section such as the South or some special interest such as those who wish to boost tariffs. The liberal advisers, with their stable of intellectuals, are securely in control of policy-making, under Senator Kennedy's close direction.

But far more important than a candidate's immediate

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, *professor of political science at Williams College, is the author of* John Kennedy, A Political Portrait *and of* Roosevelt – The Lion and the Fox.

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entourage – since he can, after all, change its make-up overnight should he wish – is the nature of his political allies, especially those who have their independent bases of power. I refer to the Senators and Representatives and pressure group leaders with whom the candidate has been conducting his campaign and with whom he would share power and influence in the job of governing the nation. These are the liberal Representatives such as Chester Bowles of Connecticut, Stewart Udall of Arizona, John Brademas of Indiana, Frank Thompson of New Jersey, Richard Bolling of Missouri, Edith Green of Oregon and scores of others. Kennedy's close political associates in the Senate have been Paul Douglas, Joseph Clark, Henry Jackson and (except during their struggle in the primaries) Hubert Humphrey. The leaders he conspicuously summoned to his councils at Hyannisport after the convention were Adlai Stevenson, Humphrey, Averell Harriman, and Mennen Williams. The group leaders he has been doing political business with are officials of the AFL-CIO, the NAACP, the Farmers Union and other such liberal organizations.

Intellectuals watching a politician in action like to ask: what does the man really believe, in the innermost recesses of his mind? The question is unrealistic. His political personality and outlook are defined in large part by the men to whom he turns for counsel, for then he establishes personal obligations to them and they can expect continuing access to him. If Kennedy leans so publicly on liberal advisers such as Archibald Cox, and on liberal aides such as Theodore Sorensen, during the campaign, when the Republicans try to make political capital out of it, should he lean any less on these advisers and aides once he has attained the relative security of office?

Is It the Ghostwriters?

Some would dismiss all this with the cynical observation that Kennedy has purchased his liberal image by hiring scores of liberal advisers and speech writers. Many have wondered whether Kennedy had simply tested the political winds and trimmed his craft in a way that seemed most likely to catch the popular breezes and carry him to the White House. His conduct of the campaign has, I think, stilled this suspicion. He has repeatedly departed from his prepared texts not to soften his liberal stand but to emphasize it. The TV debates, above all, have shown how false is the claim that Kennedy was dependent on his ghostwriters. That this man, terribly alone before 60 million viewers and listeners, could so decisively have spilled out a cataract of names, statements, legislation, dates, quotations and doctrine was illustrative of the enormous reservoir of information and ideas within that bright and capacious mind. He has shown himself deserving of Walter Lippmann's recent description: "It has been truly impressive to see the precision of Mr. Kennedy's mind, his immense command of the facts, his instinct for the crucial point, his singular lack of demagoguery and sloganeering, his intense concern and interest in the subject itself, the stability and steadfastness of his nerves and his coolness and his courage."

I do not pretend that the proof I am offering is anything new. Quite the contrary, all the items that I have mentioned – the nature of the Democratic platform, the kind of political associates Kennedy has gathered around himself, his articulation of liberal ideas under fire – are well known to anyone who has watched his performance. And here lies the supreme irony of the role of liberals in this campaign. For although they know all this, although Kennedy has taken a liberal posture few would have dreamed likely three years ago, many liberals are in effect still sitting out the 1960 election.

Most of these will vote for Kennedy. Some will even give money to the national campaign or put Kennedy bumper strips on their car. But they will vote for Kennedy largely in order to vote against Nixon, if they show up at the polls at all. And any contribution they make to the campaign will be a kind of reflex action set off by the political sights and smells and sounds of October during the quadrennial election year, rather than an act produced by their own commitment to a candidate. The question remains: why?

The answer lies in part, I think, in the kind of men who are running Kennedy's campaign. They are no more – and no less – ideological than Jim Farley or Hugh Johnson were, but whereas Johnson or Farley could deliver themselves of a good New Deal speech when need be, Kennedy's election technicians hardly bother. And certainly they are a tough, cool bunch lacking in the kind of humility that Nixon has affected so successfully. Sometimes the toughness and coolness make one wince a bit; in August, when the failure of the special session of Congress and other campaign woes had lowered morale in the Kennedy camp, his aides were saying that morale would be at a low ebb during the next month but would then start rising – probably the first case in politics of built-in, predicted and automatically compensated pessimism.

Another reason for the apathy of some liberals is that Kennedy still makes no symbolic concession to them in the image he creates. He deals in specifics rather than in generalities. Occasionally he gets off a somewhat moving sentence as he did last month when he told the Liberal Party meeting that "liberalism is not so much a party creed or a set of fixed platform promises as it is an attitude of mind and heart, a faith in man's ability through the experience of his reason and judgment to increase for himself and his fellowmen the

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amount of justice and freedom and progress which all human life deserves." Yet one feels that such a sentence *was* probably ghostwritten and that the real Kennedy shows most clearly in his handling of concrete problems. One misses in Kennedy, too, traits that Nixon has mastered – oversimplification, timing for emphasis, repetition, the use of cloudy symbols to obscure positions. One almost wishes that Kennedy would "ham it up" – that he would give the crowd a really big wave of his hand, that he would give a baby – or even a woman voter – a really lusty kiss, that he would end a telling point in such a way that the crowd would get a chance to give a big cheer, that when suggesting that we leave Mr. Truman's profanity up to Mrs. Truman he would do so with a broad smile so that we could be sure he was in on the joke too. But this is not Kennedy's way – nor is it Kennedy's way to manufacture an artificial and meretricious political style. Hence we simply have to face the fact that he may never offer liberals anything like Wilson's magnificent rhetoric or Roosevelt's warming eloquence or even the "give-'em-hell" bombast of Truman.

No Tragic Hero

But the reasons for some liberals' noncommitment to the Democratic candidate go deeper than all this. Their main difficulty with Kennedy, I think, is that he has been too successful – heir both to wealth and great political opportunity, a hero in the war, a winner in all his political battles, the possessor of glamor and good looks and of great political qualities that seem not earned but almost magically endowed. The trouble with Kennedy is that he lacks liberalism's tragic quality.

By liberalism's tragic quality I mean that so many of its finest and most passionate causes, like Spain, have been lost causes; that so many liberal heroes have had their tragic denouements, as in Lincoln's assassination, Wilson's defeat on the League, and Roosevelt's death in office; that the pursuit of great causes has often been far more rewarding emotionally than their realization; that the great achievements of liberalism have often ended, desirable though they might be, in labyrinthine legislation and huge social-welfare bureaucracies, as in the case of social security or the TVA.

Kennedy simply is – or at least has been – too successful. If he should die tomorrow in a plane crash, he would become at once a liberal martyr, for the liberal publicists of the land would rush to construct a hero out of a young man of wealth who ran the most liberal campaign in history, or out of the young Catholic who defied the forces of bigotry, or out of the wounded P-T boat commander who would not risk the life of a single American for the defense of the strategically worthless islands of Quemoy and Matsu. But Kennedy today, in sharp contrast to Stevenson, who from the beginning in 1952 and all through 1956 seemed to be fighting impossible odds, gives the impression of being too much in control of his fortunes and too much destined for success. His seems to be a liberalism without tears.

It would be easy to say that Kennedy in office will develop the passionate, evocative qualities that this brand of liberalism demands, just as Franklin Roosevelt did in the White House. For the Presidential office does work its magic on a man. But in Kennedy's case such a prediction might not come true. For he is a different type of liberal from any we have known. He is in love not with lost causes, not with passionate evocations, not with insuperable difficulties; he is in love with political effectiveness.

In Kennedy, American liberals are encountering a different kind of leader – one who missed out on much of the rhetoric of the liberalism of the 1930's but who instead constructed his liberalism slowly and belatedly and painstakingly out of his own 14 years in politics, in years of parliamentary struggle and legislative draftsmanship. His liberalism may be all the more sound and durable precisely because it was so constructed. But it is not Stevenson's liberalism, nor Truman's. It is his.

In office he would establish, I think, a kind of policy machine – with all the efficiency, productivity and dispassion that such a term denotes. Because government would have to act quickly along many lines across broad fronts, a Kennedy Administration would be obsessed with the formulation and execution of one specific program after another. He knows, I think, that the liberal agenda of the 1960's will be executed not simply in a dramatic "100 days" but in a thousand days of persistent action, that the campaign to get the country moving forward will be fought in hundreds of little, drawn-out battles in Congressional committees and cloakrooms, in government bureaus and United States embassies abroad. Such a far-flung campaign will indeed call for a policy machine powered by a steady flow of Presidential authority. But of the liberal direction of that machine there can now be no doubt.

Some liberals might find such an Administration a bit dull, especially if it were successful; few of us will be thrilled by the policy machine. Yet I think there are many of us too who feel that action is so vitally needed, so long overdue, on so many wide fronts of national purpose that we might be willing to sacrifice some of the intoxication of liberal evocations – as long as we knew that federal aid to education, an FEPC, a start on disarmament, more generous immigration policies, and all the rest, were actually going into effect.

Kennedy in his own way has shown his intense commitment to liberalism. When will the hold-out liberals show their political commitment to him?

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The Next President and Civil Rights

by Alexander M. Bickel

The promise of a self-starting, creative and expansive discharge of the Presidential power has been perhaps the most insistent theme in Senator Kennedy's campaign. It recurs particularly in discussions of civil rights. In the second television debate, Senator Kennedy thought that some civil rights objectives could be achieved by unaided executive action, and he emphasized, quoting FDR, that the Presidency is "above all, a place of moral leadership." Mr. Nixon, in turn, would not have had it otherwise. The question thus arises, what exactly are some of the powers of the President affecting civil rights?

There is a tendency to exaggerate what one man in the White House can possibly direct or even know. There is also, as Thomas Reed Powell once wrote in another connection, a certain "unwarranted animism" in the use of the phrase, "the Administration." But the President *can* summon great, immediate and effective power, provided two things are true. One, that the President conceives it to be one of his missions, domestically as well as internationally, to initiate policy and to carry it into effect on his own responsibility, and to reach out boldly and do so until he is stopped by the retaining wall of a countervailing power, such as Congress. Retaining walls there are, and there are, God knows, enough of them; a President need not stop short for fear of going too far. Mr. Kennedy certainly so conceives the office. Mr. Nixon has lately professed to, also. Mr. Eisenhower, with a few exceptions, did not, as Taft and Harding and Coolidge and Hoover before him had not. Secondly, it must be true that the President is willing, for a time at least, to devote a disproportionate share of his total effort to a domestic problem on which he wishes to exert the full reach of his influence. The decisions and the leadership that are called for cannot be delegated. The sources of the authority and of the drive that are both necessary cannot be separated. What is involved is not administration, but creative work, one might say, on the frontiers of power, and the President must be willing to immerse himself in it for a time.

If these two conditions are met, the opportunities are great. In attempting to analyze them as they bear on civil rights, one may put to one side two distinct Presidential functions: (1) recommending legislation to Congress, and (2) executing authority specifically conferred by Congress. The one is generally well understood, though there has been reason to doubt sometimes that Mr. Eisenhower quite grasped its significance. The other is delegable and is often delegated by Congress itself to Cabinet officers and the like, acting under the direction of the President. Senator Kennedy has justly complained that only six suits have been started under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, which deal with the right to vote. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was organized tardily and poorly and run without distinction. Its record is laughable when compared, for example, with that of the same Department's Antitrust Division. This is in part owing, perhaps, to certain hostile attitudes in Congress that manifest themselves in regard to both appropriations and nominations. It is owing in the largest part to complacent administration, and is to be cured by the appointment at Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level of vigorous, dedicated men. It does not demand the exertion of much more leadership than that.

There is something, however, that the President and only the President can do about the subject matter of the 1957 and 1960 acts. He is uniquely in a position to draw attention to the problem of voting rights, not by comfortable homilies but by pointing to specific, glaring abuses until the whole nation blushes. And he can heighten the importance and prestige of the Civil Rights Commission, created and given investigative powers by the 1957 act, by associating it in the public mind with his own person and office. Mr. Eisenhower took an unconscionable time making the necessary appointments to the Commission and thus establishing it after Congress had created it, and he has pretty much ignored it ever since. When the Commission has met with defiance in the South, the government's law officers have in due course vindicated it in court. That is as it should be. But the President has not responded, as he could, by appealing to public opinion on his own and indicating that it was not some miscellaneous bureaucrats who had been flouted, but the President's trusted delegates.

It will make a difference if the new President reacts in this fashion. Mr. Eisenhower's failure to do so is worth stressing because it is attributable not only to temperament but to an aspect of the conception of the passive Presidency which is of particular importance with respect to civil rights, and on which it would be extremely interesting to have Mr. Nixon express him-

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self. Basic civil rights policy is constitutional and is therefore judge-made. Mr. Eisenhower has generally taken the position that it is not for the President to have public views on matters that are in the process of being decided by the courts, and also, as in the instance of the school segregation decision, that it is no less improper to speak his own mind after the courts have acted. This is the mechanistic view of the doctrine of separation of powers, the view, to borrow a witticism of Chief Justice Taft's, that the machinery of government is really machinery. It was not the attitude of Theodore Roosevelt or even of President Taft, both of whom felt free to have convictions about the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act before and after the courts laid down theirs. It was not Franklin Roosevelt's conception, or Jackson's. And it was not Lincoln's, who had a few public thoughts about the Dred Scott case.

A President, while obliged to enforce, is free to deplore the Supreme Court's decision on schools or on the investigative powers of the Civil Rights Commission. If he chooses, however, he is also free to use his "place of moral leadership" and exploit his unique access to the minds and hearts of the American people in order to support it. Moreover, he has the power to make the principle underlying the court's decision what Lincoln called the "political rule" of his Administration. Assuming, then, that Mr. Nixon or Mr. Kennedy, agreeing with this conception of his office, was prepared to make of the principle of equal protection a "political rule," and assuming that he was willing to devote the necessary disproportionate share of his energies to its furtherance, what could he accomplish?

School Integration: The Civil Rights Commission, in a report last year, noted that many school districts attempting to evolve a desegregation plan have "no established and qualified source to which to turn for information and advice." The Commission proposed that it be given statutory authority to act as a clearing house for such information and advice, and also to act as a mediation and conciliation service helping school boards work out desegregation plans. A bill by Senator Douglas would have given similar authority to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. But the federal government's Office of Education dates back to an 1867 statute, and the description of its duties makes remarkable reading. The Office is "to collect statistics and facts showing the condition and progress of education in the several states . . . to diffuse such information respecting the organization and management of schools . . . as shall . . . promote the cause of education throughout the country."

The authority would seem to be there for the President to use. Nor is there anything to stop him from using the Office of Education to "promote the cause of education" through conciliation conferences. Senator Douglas' bill would have authorized finally the working out of an integration plan that the Attorney General might take into court and enforce. But plans can be worked out under the statute as it stands, and the President can send his law officers to court with it not as enforcement officials, if Congress fails to pass Title III, but as friends of court, which was the way they entered the original school cases and later into the Little Rock case. The money to do all this can surely be found initially, though perhaps at the cost of skimping on other matters. Congress may eventually cut or deny further appropriations, but to put the burden on Congress to stop a going government activity is different than expecting it to grant new statutory authority.

The suggestion was made at a Conference on Civil Rights at Notre Dame University early this year that the President could establish the policy of not granting any federal aid to a college or university that discriminates in selecting its student body. The President may wish to give an opportunity for compliance rather than laying down a flat rule, and he should grant hearings (though not personally, of course) in cases where the facts may be in dispute. But otherwise, as Father Hesburgh of Notre Dame indicated, the only thing that is lacking is the will.

Housing: The President has the power to follow the 1959 recommendation of the Civil Rights Commission and establish a policy of requiring non-discrimination in federally-aided housing. It should, no doubt, again not be a flat rule, for that might deprive Negroes as well as others of any new housing in areas where it is worst needed. But the authority to exert pressure is available, and it could be now employed most fruitfully perhaps, in the North.

Government Building, Employment and Contracts: The President can, if he wishes, enforce the principle of equal protection in the employment practices of the government and its contractors, and thus incidentally cover a considerable segment of the economy. Mr. Eisenhower has declared this to be his policy by Executive Order, and he has delegated a Committee on Government Contracts, headed by the Vice President, to implement it. And that is all he has done, except to complain to Congress that the Committee could do its job better if it had statutory authority. The problem is complex, involving as it does, for one example, labor union practices, and it is even larger than it is complex. It needs less a statute and more the public attention and drive a President can give toward its solution. That, to repeat, is the single most important generalization applying to everything that could be done on the President's unaided executive authority.

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THE FUTURE IN SEARCH OF A CANDIDATE

In three earlier articles Mr. Harrison discussed the records of Lyndon B. Johnson, Stuart Symington and John F. Kennedy, suggesting that the search for a Democratic Presidential candidate pointed to Senator Kennedy as most likely to give enlightened leadership in foreign policy. This concluding analysis of the political repercussions in this country of "a more and more competitive world economy" shows why this competition strikes with special force at the Democrats – and why, if Kennedy is to carry out a responsible foreign economic policy, an Administration of his may have to impart a new meaning to bipartisanship.

Needed – A New Bipartisanship?

by Selig S. Harrison

The most far-reaching political pronouncement of recent weeks had nothing to do with the campaign: it was the manifesto of the 16 Southern Governors who repudiated the Democratic free trade tradition and embraced economic nationalism. The Governors in their resolution at Hot Springs, Arkansas, on September 28 spoke of "foreign-produced goods . . . usurping the American market place." They asked for an end to US concessions in international trade bargaining, for the imposition of import quotas in a long list of industries, for Congressional reappraisal of all our trade legislation; and in so doing, they went far beyond the more cautious protectionist language of the 1960 Republican platform.

The Governors today speak for the new industrial owners and managers of their region, just as the GOP reflected the high tariff interests of the New England manufacturers in first subscribing to protectionism a century ago. But the Southerners are not voicing a limited regional grievance. The nation as a whole is slowly becoming aware of its changing relationship to a more and more competitive world economy. The Southern response is simply a stark example of what is a national transformation – a transformation so entwined in technical economic discussion of "balance of payments" and "gold reserves" that we may fail to see its deep political significance.

Industry after industry throughout the country now finds itself challenged as never before by imports and, at the same time, priced out of an increasing number of foreign markets. Though we sense as a nation that this is a moment demanding more rather than less economic internationalism, the climb in our standard of living puts us at so great a disadvantage in the immediate economic contest with other countries that we are in danger of falling back, almost unaware, into a defensive and negative posture. Politically, the Republican reflex on matters of foreign economic policy has normally been to fall back on protectionism. What appears to be new at the present moment, and here lies our concern, is that the traditional Democratic internationalism shows signs of serious erosion.

"Foreign-produced goods" conjures up an image of half-dressed Japanese or Indians slave driven in dank factories, grinding out replicas of everything from transistor radios to umbrellas. Or the phrase calls to mind the Volkswagen – a symbol of the postwar rebirth of West European industry. Foreign goods prosper in our markets in such volume, say the Southern Governors, because "they are manufactured under wage and working condition standards which are at odds with American public policy and . . . not because they meet demands that cannot be met by domestic enterprise." In other words, foreigners aren't playing the game, and the thing to do is to lay down our own rules by imposing higher tariffs and import quotas.

This is the old-style protectionism, which has always had, in its own narrow terms, a certain logic. But in 1960 it leaves out something new: the increasing number of *American* manufacturers who are setting up plants in other countries (*Newsweek* quoted the National Industrial Conference Board last week as reporting $600 million in new spending by US industry for plants abroad in the first six months of this year – a 20 percent increase over 1959). The US manufacturer goes abroad not only to leapfrog tariff barriers and to exploit markets overseas, but to gain a better competitive advantage in holding the US market against foreign rivals. Some

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of these overseas operations may be located in the low-wage territory of Asia, Africa or Latin America, but they are much more likely to be in the high-productivity industrial centers of Western Europe. To take a random example, Remington Rand has announced that by the end of the year it will be making all of its standard and portable typewriters in Europe. Commerce Department figures show that one-third of the typewriters now sold in the US are made abroad, that foreign imports account for as much as half of the US market in such items as barbed wire and hardwood plywood, and that over-all imports rose to $1.2 billion during August, 1960, alone. Of the $79 million currently budgeted for modernization by Goodyear Tire and Rubber, nearly half will be spent outside the United States. General Motors, which plans no major domestic expansion, has budgeted $200 million to build up overseas facilities.

While it is true our exports are rising and our balance of trade remains favorable, politically speaking what matters is that the level of imports is also rising and that so much US investment is moving abroad. A relatively minor migration of US capital from a particular section of the country has a disproportionate impact on rank-and-file workers whose thoughts turn naturally to the defense of their jobs. Nor is the migration likely to slow down. The board chairman of US Rubber offers business a new slogan for survival – "Go Global."

The Southern Defection

No words will be expended here to support the assumption that adequate foreign aid, together with discretionary authority on the part of the Executive in trade matters, are indispensable tools a President must have in the Sixties. Moreover, no exhaustive documentation is necessary to show that the winds of economic nationalism are blowing harder and harder throughout the land. The Tariff Commission reports a doubled work load this year over last. The US Chamber of Commerce, long partial to internationalist trade policies, has removed crucial free trade planks from its policy statement. Protectionism is plainly on the increase, and though this presents problems enough in itself, the phenomenon takes on added importance because it is almost imperceptibly broadened to a sweeping anti-foreignism in which foreign aid becomes nothing more than the creation of future competition.

To illustrate, the newsletters and pamphlets of the influential management lobby, the Southern States Industrial Council, present the case for states-rights conservatism on most matters with some semblance of sobriety and orderliness. But on foreign aid and imports, the literature lapses into illogic and emotion. In August, 1959, urging an end to all economic aid, the Council told the Senate Appropriations Committee that "it simply is not true that poverty breeds Communism . . . our American South was devastated and laid waste in the Civil War. There was no Marshall Plan or foreign aid to help it. But did the South go Communist or socialist? NO, it didn't. It went to work." In an editorial entitled, "Eventually, Why Not Now?," the Council *Bulletin* declares that "if anything in this world is certain, it is that the South will eventually make a clean break with its traditional free trade position. Such a policy made sense so long as the region was predominantly agricultural and depended for a large part of its livelihood on exports of cotton and tobacco. It makes no sense in the modern, highly industrialized South, whose domestic market for textiles, chemicals and a hundred and one other products is injured by low-cost foreign imports."

To appreciate the strength of the new Southern opposition to aid and trade one must remember that it comes not from a few isolationists of the Vardaman, Bilbo, or Bob Reynolds type. When Herman Talmadge talks against foreign aid today he is talking not only to and for the rednecks but to the respectable industrial and utilities elite of the New South. The 16 vice presidents of the Southern States Industrial Council include the board chairmen, presidents or vice presidents of Monsanto Chemical and Phillips Petroleum, of a gas company in Savannah, a railroad in Louisville, and a steel company in Fort Worth. The Southern textile manufacturers who worry about Japanese imports and who lobby so conspicuously in Congress are only the noisy advance guard of a wide-ranging Southern assault on the old-style internationalism of the region.

Throughout the Administrations of Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman, and even in the first years of the Eisenhower Administration, internationalist policies had their most reliable year-in, year-out support from Southern Congressmen and Senators. V. O. Key, Jr., in his definitive study *Southern Politics*, found in a check of Senate roll calls in the late Thirties that Southern Democrats were more cohesive than any other regional political bloc in support of reciprocal trade (94.8 percent as against 84.1 percent of non-Southern Democrats). In the vote enacting the Marshall Plan, only 12 of 128 Southern votes in the House were cast against ECA – 9 percent of the Southerners as against 20 percent of all non-Southerners.

By the middle of the Eisenhower Administration, however, a shift had become noticeable. In the spring of 1956, on a critical House vote to deprive the President of authority to determine under the Trade Act when the "peril point" was reached, and when to impose higher duties, almost half of all voting Southern Congressmen took the protectionist side. On June 29, 1956, all eight of the Democratic votes supporting a 50 percent cut in aid to India were cast by Southern Senators. Reviewing Southern Congressional performance in the

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Eisenhower years, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., professor of political science at American University, has reported that the number of Southern House members voting against the mutual security bill jumped from 23 in 1952 to 69 in 1959 and that the number has remained relatively stable at or near 70 since 1957. Last year, when the Senate turned down the Foreign Relations Committee's proposal to give long-term financing to the Development Loan Fund, it was Spessard Holland of Florida, Richard Russell of Georgia, and Sam Ervin of North Carolina who were mainly responsible for thwarting Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright. Surprisingly, Lister Hill of Alabama turned up among those voting against Fulbright. When the House Appropriations Committee voted 26-18 on March 20, 1959, against even additional short-term monies for the Loan Fund, 12 of the 13 Southern Democrats on the Committee joined with the anti-aid Republicans. No other regional bloc showed similar cohesion.

Indeed, Professor Lerche maintains that the South has replaced the Midwest as the stronghold of American isolationism. Of the 130-odd negative votes cast against the foreign aid bill in 1959 and 1960, he points out, 49 percent came from the South in both years and an average of only 39 percent from the Midwest.

In a state-by-state analysis of Southern Congressional voting patterns, Lerche offers the suggestive discovery that "the states that went the furthest in their antipathy to foreign aid . . . were the states where the race issue has bitten deepest." (Mississippi Representatives led the list with anti-aid votes 83 percent of the time.) Aid and trade serve as a scapegoat, this would suggest, for the multiple anxieties of a South in transition. As the old order gives way under the pressures of an industrial and a racial revolution, "the new mass truculence needs targets . . . the list of these 'enemies' of the South is long, but its leading members include . . . Chief Justice Warren, the NAACP, Mr. Nehru, the Communist Party . . . and such disparate figures as Eleanor Roosevelt, Thomas E. Dewey, Walter Reuther and Paul Butler." The Indian Prime Minister would no doubt be surprised to find that he has made the list, but this is not inexplicable when one stops to consider how a race-minded Southerner must react to the impertinence of Asian and African leaders daring to present themselves at the UN as the equals of Eisenhower or Macmillan.

Some students of the South maintain that the region was never really "internationalist" in the first place: it voted the free trade line because of its dependence on foreign markets for its crops, and it went along with a preparedness bill or a Marshall Plan out of a sense of patriotism which was basically a sense of regional patriotism, of nativist self-awareness as a "pure" Anglo-Saxon bastion set apart from the urban North and Midwest with its Irish and German immigrants. "The very passion for 'Americanism' in the South," writes W. J. Cash in *The Mind of the South*, "was at least in great part the passion that the South should remain fundamentally unchanged."

Strains on the North-South Alliance

To be sure, the South is exposed to powerful national – and international – cosmopolitanizing influences, and the present parochialism cannot survive indefinitely. But one suspects that it will persist for some years, that it will gain greatly in intensity before the force is spent, and that in the interim the political consequences will be profound. For the Southern position on free trade has been the principal link giving strength and plausibility to the North-South Democratic alliance. On the really critical domestic economic issues, Northern and Southern Democrats have agreed to disagree for more than 80 years. The conservative coalition in Congress can be traced back in a continuing line to the bargain struck by the Southern leaders and the Republicans in 1877, and the coalition has often made the whole American party system seem meaningless. If a certain order has always taken form out of the chaos, it has had its basis, to a great extent, in the clear difference between the two parties on trade.

Free trade has been an article of faith for the Democrats – as has protectionism for the Republicans – from the start of our party evolution. Jefferson in 1793 argued that it was America's destiny to produce raw materials in exchange for Europe's manufactures. Hamilton spoke for the emergent manufacturing class. "In another generation," writes Stuart Gerry Brown in *The First Republicans*, "the drive for manufacture brought the industrial revolution to the US, as Hamilton had hoped. For more than a hundred years the question of protective tariffs as against free trade characterized the American party division." The issue became a sectional one in which the South saw itself victimized for the benefit of manufacturing interests concentrated in the North. By the time of the Jacksonians, however, the controversy had taken on a class as well as a sectional significance and it became a stock argument of northern Democrats that high tariffs merely helped factory owners to get richer while working men were forced to pay the higher prices made possible by the protectionist barrier. The Democratic party line on trade runs more or less uninterrupted from Calhoun in 1828 to Cleveland versus McKinley 60 years later, to Cordell Hull, and it is this continuity that has given the Democrats their most significant ideological *raison d'être* for the alliance of North and South.

The alliance made some sense so long as each partner, if for somewhat different reasons, felt a sense of

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common cause on at least this one principle of central importance. But in 1960 the Republicans come closest to talking the language of the Southern Governors. The national Democratic platform in promising "trade adjustment" measures (federal loans, tax incentives, defense contracts) for import-afflicted communities pointedly avoids the protectionist tone of the GOP pledge to give "effective administration of the Trade Agreements Act's escape clause and peril point provisions" ("clearly a higher tariff position," commented *The New York Times*). The North-South alliance thus loses its ideological backbone. It is reduced to the status of a traders' arrangement in which initiative passes back and forth from the Southern political elder (who needs the North to protect his vested interests in the present setup, especially his Congressional seniority) to the Presidential candidate such as Senator Kennedy (who values Southern electoral votes as insurance in an uncertain countrywide contest). No doubt mutual interest will keep the traders in a reasonably conciliatory frame of mind on a host of issues for some years. Nevertheless, a long-term process of disjunction in the present relationship of forces within and between our parties appears to be well underway. Conceivably, the process could lead to a more intelligible national political alignment. If this election signals a movement of the Southern industrial elite to a regular Republican commitment, and if a Kennedy Administration is true to its promise on foreign economic policy, many Southern Democratic local organizations may experience severe inner convulsions. A two-party South may become a possibility – with impetus coming not only from Negro enfranchisement but also from the protectionist issue.

Rumblings in Labor

But what if the national Democratic leadership does not force the issue? While the Republicans can in many cases give their reflexes free play in responding to protectionist pressures, the Democrats must reconcile their traditional internationalist commitment with the changing facts of domestic political life. The problem would be more manageable if opposition to free trade and long-term foreign aid were limited to a recalcitrant Southern bloc. It is oppressive precisely because fear of foreign competition is not a regional matter. The Southern defection on trade and aid is in a sense the cutting edge of a national defection, most conspicuous to date in the West and in the Mountain States, but spreading even into the industrial North.

Democratic National Chairman Henry M. Jackson observed on September 17 after a campaign tour that "the trade problem is coming up on us fast," adding that Congress would have to adjust to a new national state of mind. Democratic candidates who have faced the voters this year could cite chapter and verse. With an eye to Tennessee's "shirt-factory towns," alarmed at Japanese competition, Estes Kefauver, a free trader in the Hull tradition, had to defend himself against a protectionist attack in his July primary contest with a reminder that he has "consistently voted" to strengthen peril point provisions of the Trade Act. One of the most constructive Democratic internationalists in the House, A. S. J. Carnahan of Missouri, second-ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a US delegate in 1957 to the UN General Assembly, has just lost the Eighth District seat he has held for 14 years. The young politician who upset him was able to capitalize on Carnahan's reputation as a mainstay of the aid and trade programs, appealing to lead miners and glass workers who blame imports for the depressed state of their industries. To the farmers, the challenger, Richard Ichord, managed to suggest that Carnahan had been so busy worrying about the world that he had not done enough to bring rural areas new industries, which is to say, new jobs for farmers forced off the land.

Lewis W. Roop, publisher of the *DeSoto Press*, located in the heart of Missouri's populous industrial Jefferson County, states that "dissatisfaction with the results of our foreign aid program . . . and the desire to place the blame for the drop in employment in this area on the importing of glass and minerals, definitely had a reaction in the Mineral Area counties." These counties have nearly half (128,266) the population of the Eighth District. Unemployment in the Mineral Counties neared 5,000 in July – 17 percent of the labor force, as against 9 percent in December, 1959 – and totalled 2,000 in Jefferson Country. In the past, Congressman Carnahan carried all these counties, and the fact that he lost them this time explains to a great extent his 7,000-vote margin of defeat.

The Carnahan case takes on special interest when one considers the inability of labor to maintain a solid front for its candidate. Although the major leaders of the District's miners were for Carnahan, the president of a key Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers local in the lead mining center of Flat River came out two weeks before the election with an attack on him, alleging that he had not fought hard enough for lead subsidies. The damage this did is a measure of the susceptibility of the labor rank and file to fears of foreign competition.

The National Planning Association in a recent report on US policy in Latin America points out that the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union has been as responsible as the mine owners for restrictive US actions in levying lead and zinc quotas. Perhaps the most striking testimony to the rumblings within labor is the fact that when the shock of the Volkswagen invasion first hit Detroit in May, 1959, Walter Reuther, while stressing that the German auto makers should raise their

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pay scales, felt compelled to murmur of a possible import "penalty" which would bridge the gap between German and US wage standards. ("Abolish the word "tariff'," taunted the *Detroit News*. "Talk instead of imposing a 'penalty'. . . . One can then be for penalties and against tariffs. What could be simpler?") The UAW has since reaffirmed its internationalist position, but Mr. Reuther on September 4 called the trade problem "a very difficult one . . . I think that to pretend that it will go away is very dangerous and unrealistic."

The problem will not go away in the minds of the labor rank and file if only because management harps on the dangers of foreign competition. Throughout the steel strike the industry staked its case against a wage increase largely on this argument, and the magazine *Steel* recently claimed that 700,000 American jobs have been lost as a consequence of shifts in our trade balance. Labor spokesmen have suggested that in locating new plants abroad, US industry is waging a kind of psychological warfare against US labor. To the extent that this is so, industry is playing a dangerous game – inevitably generating protectionist sentiment.

But to suggest that labor's dilemma is a management creation is a travesty of a complex reality. Machinist leader Al Hayes overstates the labor case when he contends that "high wages in America are the excuse, not the reason that we are meeting difficulty in our effort to compete in world markets." Clearly, high wages not only contribute to the difficulty; they symbolize the disparity in living standards which explains, at bottom, why the US finds itself increasingly unable to price its goods competitively in world markets. What Mr. Hayes has in mind is that quality control and all the productivity tricks which were originated by US industry have been taken over and in many cases improved upon by industry abroad: American industry, he says in effect, has been resting on its laurels and must now pioneer again in productivity advances and in finding new ways to cut costs. This is a generally accepted proposition, but no tinkering with techniques can alter the pivotal fact that our rising standard of private affluence affects in a hundred visible and invisible ways the prices of our products. Advertising is an obvious case of an overhead "extra" in our cost-price structure which is not present to the same degree in Japan or Italy.

Labor can properly insist that all sectors of society should bear equally the burdens of adjusting to the new international economic challenge. This is easier said than done, however, for labor happens to be in the direct line of fire as the nation begins its attack on the challenge. All that one can hope is that management does not seize on our national dilemma as an alibi for anti-labor policies, and that within labor the influence of such men as Reuther and Hayes prevails during a difficult period when wage increases will be challenged in the name of the foreign economic threat, at the same time that American workers are discovering in foreign competition a scapegoat for unemployment. For wage increases will, without doubt, be increasingly questioned by serious students of national policy who have no management axe to grind. "Sound domestic politics are the ultimate foundation on which our new dollar diplomacy will stand or fall," writes Columbia Law School Professor Richard N. Gardner (a Kennedy adviser) in *Foreign Affairs*. "We must check the creeping inflation of our costs and prices, or insure at least that we inflate somewhat less rapidly than our main industrial competitors. Labor will have to show greater restraint in limiting demands for wage increases to increases in productivity."

The Climate of Economic Nationalism

Automation may offer a recourse for many US firms seeking to maintain their competitive position. But this panics organized labor, fearful of sudden, large-scale unemployment, as much as the selection of Brussels over Buffalo as the site for a new plant. Moreover, as US industry automates to avoid being priced out of domestic and foreign markets, the inevitably widening technological and economic gap dividing the West from the developing countries will get that much wider. The need for massive Western economic aid for the developing countries will be that much more monumental. And yet the political climate of economic nationalism will make it that much more difficult for the next President to extract from Congress both large-scale, long-term aid appropriations and liberal trade legislation.

This political climate will be more than ordinarily subject to violent mercurial shifts in response to changing economic developments. Should 1961 prove, as so many predict, to be a recession year, consumers with less money to spend might spend more of it on low-priced foreign imports. Inflation in the US would send already non-competitive US prices still higher, while the leveling off of Western European economic growth reported in *The Wall Street Journal* on October 14 could, in any case, spell a decreasing demand for US exports. The next President may face a Congress which will give him majority support for adequate aid and trade legislation only if the sources of support in both parties can be effectively tapped to offset opposition also found, in something approaching equal measure, within both Republican and Democratic ranks.

When one ponders the prospect of a drift in varying degrees to economic nationalism by the South, on the one hand, and by labor-backed urban Democrats on the other, one concludes that it is time to re-examine the dichotomy often made between the Democrats as the staunchly internationalist party in world affairs and

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the Republicans as the prisoners of an isolationist wing. The dichotomy is blurred, for example, when one ponders Gunnar Myrdal's contention that by its nature, "the democratic welfare state in the rich countries of the Western world is protectionist and nationalistic", and when one bears in mind that the Democrats are, after all, the party of the welfare state in US terms.

In his new book *Beyond the Welfare State*, Myrdal discusses "this national introversion of the mind" in the US and some countries of Western Europe. "In the mental climate of the protective welfare state, international issues other than defense . . . implying sacrifices for others who are outside the comprehensive national security system the citizens have provided for themselves, directly as voters or through their organizations . . . become embarrassing." With support for an internationalist measure most often "not special to any particular group but general and widely dispersed . . . it easily succumbs whenever it comes up against any special interest, however petty."

Although, comparing the platforms and the views of the candidates in 1960, Senator Kennedy plainly emerges as the best hope for strong internationalist leadership in foreign economic policy, this is not to say that the Democrats as a party are much more solid than the Republicans as a base of political support for such leadership. It is the influence of that sector of business with a stake in export operations that has held the Eisenhower Administration to its very modest measure of internationalist economic policy. This is an influence which is felt primarily within the Republican Party, and it may provide a badly needed counterforce in the course of the years ahead to the parochial influences welling up within the Democratic coalition. Probably the need for such support from the internationally-minded business community will not be so acute as to require explicit bipartisanship – the appointment of a Republican Secretary of State, for example – but it will demand many forms of implicit partnership with Republicans in Congress at the very outset of a Kennedy Administration. The only circumstance in which there would be no need at all to seek a bipartisan base of support would be a Kennedy tidal wave powerful enough to give him commanding prestige and to wash up behind him, among the newly-elected Democrats, a sizeable bloc of dedicated internationalists.

It is an open question how much help Lyndon Johnson would be to a Kennedy Administration in combating the new economic nationalism. Senator Johnson sees the big picture, but do the independent oilmen who are helping him in his effort to carry Texas? They are counting on accelerated efforts in behalf of tight import quotas on oil – despite the fact that oil quotas represent an ever more obvious handicap in our efforts to compete with the Soviet price-cutting offensive against Western oil suppliers (tankers which would be coming into port in the US are freed by the quotas for Soviet hire at bargain prices). Senator Johnson, if he is true to form, would try to do what the oilmen want while still following a generally internationalist line. Even Johnson, however, would find it virtually impossible to work the protectionist side on oil and at the same time give strong leadership to the free trade forces. For in the politics of trade, logrolling has its classic logic: one politician can get support for his own special cause only through reciprocal trading in which all are caught up in a common political current.

Senator Kennedy may have complicated what would in any event have been a trial of leadership by certain nods to protectionist opinion during the campaign. In accordance with the Democratic platform, he has given greatest emphasis to federal assistance for communities hard hit by imports (rejected by the Republican platform, though not by such GOP liberals as Jacob K. Javits) and to intensified diplomatic efforts toward removing barriers confronting our exports. But in Manchester, New Hampshire, he said, "we can protect our textile and shoe industries"; in a question and answer series in the Scripps-Howard newspapers, he accented "the vigorous use of protective provisions by Congress, such as the 'escape clause' of the Trade Agreements Act"; addressing the Associated Business Publications Conference, he contrasted his past help to industries under the peril point provisions of the Trade Act with that of President Eisenhower; and he has led Southern textile manufacturers to believe that their demands for mandatory quotas would get more sympathetic treatment from him than from Mr. Nixon.

Now Senator Kennedy wants to be elected, and in a closely contested campaign, these relatively small gestures may tell us more about his political adeptness than they do about any lack of determination to stare down the protectionists once in the White House. At the same time, the fact that these gestures have been made may prove inconvenient should he win. For he will face an international economy in which even the slightest compromises with economic parochialism at home will more and more gravely imperil the national interest. In the long run, the dictates of an interdependent world economy seem irresistible; the question is how long the agonies of the short run must be prolonged, and this is where Presidential stamina can make all the difference. In a recent conversation in Houston, that veteran champion of liberal trade policies, former Undersecretary of State Will L. Clayton, observed that although "protectionist sentiment over the country is indeed getting more intense and more vocal, don't forget that the knowledge of the people has grown greatly. I can't believe we'll take a backward step. In spite of the terrific pressures that will be brought to bear, the people as a whole will save us from adopting a narrow economic view – if they have some leadership."

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The Day Britain Died

by Patrick O'Donovan

The subject of the defeat and utter ruin of Britain is one that most novelists find fairly easy to resist. Yet every now and again the subject recurs, each time with its own, built-in sado-masochistic pleasures. The thing is not beyond the bonds of possibility and it makes an admirable pulpit from which to denounce the sins of the time.

Not unnaturally, such books are usually the work of right wing authors who believe that the Ruling Class has betrayed its trust or that all that is Good and Traditional is being swamped by new ideas that, anyway, are not English. Wars stimulate such writings. Saki, in the First World War, produced "When William Came," which was a jolly, anti-Semitic and anti-German little horror in which the final integrity of the British will to survive in the face of defeat was demonstrated by the refusal of the boy scouts to march past the new Western Emperor (Kaiser Wilhelm) in Hyde Park. The second war spawned its paper backs that toyed with the idea of Hitler's victory. And now the Cold War has produced its offering.

When the Kissing Had to Stop has shocked a lot of people and many have enjoyed the shock. It does not at all conform to the iron-clad ideology of the ruling British reviewers. It has, it is true, been serialized in *The London Daily Express* which is an accolade that is given for other than literary reasons and which fairly accurately demonstrates its politics. But even if you loathe its ideas, the book still has not only the strange fascination of its subject, but it is technically a brilliant performance and it is damnably difficult to ignore. This is a story about the death of Britain and its slow and inevitable digestion by Russia. Its message is clearly attached to the present non-partisan agitation against the H-Bomb by intellectuals and clergymen and enthusiastic young people and to the surge of enthusiasm for unilateralism within the leadership of the Trades Union Movement. For this is how the book opens, with a group of left-wing innocents, charlatans and asses advocating nuclear disarmament from the plinth of Nelson's column.

When The Kissing Had to Stop
by Constantine FitzGibbon
(Norton; $3.95)

There is a cast of recognizable characters: the decent, rather hopeless Irish peer trying to make a living in business, the witty, splendid actress, the rich tradition-haunted Jew turned Catholic and a crowd of sickly ambitious men of the left. There is also the young English diplomat who has defected to Russia and is found in an appalling Work Camp on the Arctic circle; he is a drunken homosexual who has been thrown aside by the Russians and dreams of Mummy and nursery tea and Oxford. He is let back to England for a little and ends back in the camp.

It pictures a diseased island where the police have turned leathery and brutal, where juvenile delinquency has flowered into public perversions and the uncontrollable rule of crime. The H-bomb agitators trick the government into defeat. The white haired do-gooders and the steely climbers take over and, slowly, step by step, surrender honor and the ancient sovereignty to a Russia that plans, with a preternatural wisdom, each step and cynically takes advantage of each high minded act of stupidity or treachery.

It ends in a night time of brutality that is made the more appalling by the green fields and the country houses. The charming people are all swept away. In the latest death list from the concentration camps (listed in rigid alternation as by cancer and tuberculosis) the actress appears without distinction. She has been crushed to death by tanks in a prison riot. The politicians who made the disaster possible are eliminated. The Catholic Jew leads guerrillas in the Welsh mountains. And you are left, after a long fascinating ride through whatever is the opposite to a tunnel of love with the impression that someone has been taught a pretty sharp lesson. Bertrand Russell, Canon Collins, Frank Cousins and that school master who keeps trying to get arrested have had their ideas exposed in a singularly trenchant and almost convincing manner.

Except for one important fact. The novel is based on the premise that there is something soft and perverted and dishonest and traitorous in the essential idea of liberalism. Accept that and this is your book, the sort you will want to send to your friends for their comfort and delight.

This idea, this instinctual recoiling from liberalism is common to extremists both on the left and the right. Yet Mr. FitzGibbon is not an extremist. He has written elsewhere the story of the attempt to murder Hitler. He wrote it with admiration and humility and at least some of those would-be tyrannicides were the sort of liberal Christians

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that he has crucified here. One is tempted to a fanciful explanation.

Mr. FitzGibbon is of the mid-Atlantic culture. He is by citizenship an American and, though he is an expatriate, he neither rejects his mother country nor casually reviles it. He wrote of the London blitz with love and compassion. He is at home among the dark reaches of Irish genealogy. He has shown no detectable signs of any diseased nationalism or party loathings. But perhaps a racial attitude does persist. And here, for certain, the ground turns shaky and uncertain and we cross a bog.

"Liberalism" is a word that is bandied about less freely by Americans. The principles implicit in that civilized humanism applied to politics are accepted as implicit in the American system. There is not in America quite the same presentable alternative of a dignified and defensible system – conservatism as a philosophical and even gentle system based not only on experience (and fear of the mob) but also on a great lineage of saints and philosophers and political writers and parliamentary heroes. Perhaps liberalism to the author does not mean great war leaders like Clemenceau and Lloyd George, nor the factory acts and Irish independence and freedom for India (though maybe it does mean just that) and the end of the slave trade and Ernie Bevin fulminating about the Russians. His seems to be the American memory of men who chose to step outside the system and threatened it in the process – pathetic attempts to found third parties which weakened more important efforts, the intellectual vanity of dons playing Icarus to the Communist sun, of mousey spies believing they were serving mankind in betraying their country, above all, of a sort of blind, embattled vanity that set itself against the nature and purpose of a nation that does not question its principles.

Whatever the reason that drove him to adopt so surprising (and unfashionable) a premise the fact remains that here is another bitter and self-denunciatory book out of England. In the new classical manner, it rejects the times and the society in which it is written. But unlike the rest of the "angry" genre in which the political content is of small importance, in which it is the protest alone that counts and in which there remains, like sediment, a hankering for the old persecuted days of cloth capped, chapel socialism, this book is fired unashamedly from the right and from a very long way over on the right wing at that. Here there is despair rather than *accidie*. Here is the voice, not of toryism, not even of the Republican party, but of something much rarer in Britain or America, the voice of the old, hopeless, self-loving right that for nearly two hundred years has seen its own repeated death as the end of the world.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Patrick O'Donovan *is a foreign correspondent for* The Observer *of London.* Charles Burton Marshall *is a member of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, and Alumni Visiting Professor at the University of North Carolina. He is the author of* The Limits of Foreign Policy. Saul E. Halpert *is on the journalism faculty of the University of California at Los Angeles.*

The Quemoy-Matsu Loophole

by Charles Burton Marshall

Communist control enveloped mainland China in 1949. With a remnant of its forces, the Nationalist regime retreated to Formosa. It kept a slender grip on a few islands just off the mainland shore. In 1950 the United States interposed its fleet to preserve the military status quo in the Formosa strait. The purpose was to prevent the Korean struggle and the Chinese war from spilling into each other.

The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles
by Tang Tsou
(University of Utah Press pamphlet)

Chiang Kai-shek had purposes of a different sort. His ambition was to merge the two fights and, with United States support, to reopen war on the mainland. As a step to this, he aimed to deploy large portions of his Nationalist forces to the offshore islands whose strategic significance related not to the defense of Formosa but to the fact that from them a landing on the mainland could be threatened. The Administration in Washington was cold to the idea, but it got a sympathetic hearing with John Foster Dulles, then serving as special advisor in the State Department. Nothing came of it until Mr. Dulles' advent as Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration. As a psychological gesture intended to spur the Chinese Communists to an armistic in Korea, the new Administration announced the unleashing of the Nationalist forces. To lend verisimilitude to the ploy, the interdiction of military movements in the Formosa strait was modified. Chiang made his move to the offshore islands. What persuasions and assurances were added to permission as stimuli must be a matter for conjecture at least until the opening of relevant archives in some indefinite future.

Tang Tsou's study, entitled *The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles*, refers to "pressure exerted by the US Military Advisory Group on Nationalist officials to strengthen the garrisons" – a pressure which, he asserts, laid a basis for the Nationalist government's later claim of a moral commitment from the United States to defend the islands.

The hankypanky seems plausible. The mystique of psychological warfare had dogmatic force in that phase of the Eisenhower Administration. The State Department, the Pentagon, and White House offices abounded with devotees to cleverness. Surreptitiousness was the way of wisdom. The double life provided a formula for reaping advantage without incurring liability.

It is a fallacious formula. Policy always has to balance its books. Chickens do come home to roost. So the country is stuck with this Quemoy-Matsu issue. Those who from on high would have been the ones to pull the strings have ever after acted as if influenced by some unadmitted fault of conscience. This would explain the persistent ambiguity of our pledges and the inhibition that shows through in subsequent efforts to get Chiang to restore his forces to a sensible position.

Sometime, when more evidence be-

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comes available, a large and searching book on the Quemoy-Matsu predicament will have to be written. Until then, it is good to have at hand Tang Tsou's timely small study, a product of the Institute of International Studies of the University of Utah and the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy of the University of Chicago. Within the limits of the now knowable, it puts the facts in helpful perspective and serves as a useful guide to the current debate.

Tang Tsou makes an important point of the failure to get the offshore island issue straightened out in 1954, at the time of the making of the mutual defense treaty with Chiang's regime. It was an enormous bumble. Those who some day attempt definitive evaluations of the late Secretary Dulles' achievements will have to grapple with it. Tang Tsou makes much also of Chiang's adroitness in using the Quemoy-Matsu loophole to escape from the box we tried to put him in at the time of the releashing. Mao may well share quietly with Chiang an appreciation of the cleverness displayed by Chiang in subsequently building up the garrisons to a point where the underpinnings of his regime on Formosa were plausibly involved in the fate of the tiny islands. The present situation is a predicament for us but not for them. It serves the interests of both in closing any approach to the two-Chinas formula. From their diverse promises, they must have a common satisfaction in having us over a barrel.

However barren as a gambit in the Korean armistice negotiations, the Nationalist deployment to the offshore islands does provide us with the one foreign policy issue which gets the candidate away from pious abstraction and down to brass tacks. Despite the reported hand-wringing in the State Department and the Pentagon over the harm allegedly done by having our predicament thus made the subject of open debate between Presidential candidates, I regard the result as salutary. It is good to be reminded that a nation must abide by the consequences of even its offhand follies; that ambiguity cannot go on forever; that somewhere along the road lies a choice – either knowingly to accept the danger of persisting in a pointless risk or to clear up the situation by cutting losses.

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THEATER

Comedians from the Underground

An Evening with Mike Nichols and Elaine May
(John Golden Theater)

Because of its harsh and critical spirit, and because it aims at the brain rather than the gut, satire has never exactly been a popular form on Broadway, but over the past fifteen years it has been disappearing from our stage (not to mention our literature and movies) at an alarming rate. There are obvious economic reasons for this. In the media that depend on mass support, any art as subtle as satire is inevitably a poor financial risk unless offered in comparatively small doses. There are cultural reasons, too, though these are more debatable. James Thurber used to blame the decline of legitimate satire on the fears and tensions of the McCarthy era, but I must confess I never found this completely persuasive. It was not a McCarthyite who complained recently that a parody of Japanese movies by Sid Caesar was an insult to Orientals: it was the liberal-minded TV reviewer for *The New York Times*

Much of our legitimate culture is manipulated and supported by just such progressive, well-meaning, and soupy-headed citizens, and this may explain why the stage still shuns satire years after McCarthy descended to his reward. Ever since Plato, it has been obvious that if your major concern is with the community (either as a Legion patriot or a Liberal defender of minority groups), you will not feel very sympathetic to genuine art unless it supports your social convictions – which art, being highly individualistic, very rarely does. On the other hand, while satire is more subversive of society than any other literary genre, it has, fortunately, not yet been completely banished from the Republic. The growing emphasis on community welfare in America has managed to destroy our farce comedy, forcing anarchists like Groucho Marx, Phil Silvers, and Bert Lahr into more socially acceptable pursuits, but so far it has merely diverted satire from the legitimate culture into more furtive channels without affecting its quality. America may not be able to boast of any satiric novels, films, or plays to equal *Lucky Jim*, *I'm All Right Jack* or *Expresso Bongo*, but the political monologues of Mort Sahl, the confessional soliloquies of Lenny Bruce, and the relentless comic strips of Jules Feiffer make up an underground body of satiric expression enormously penetrating in its effect despite the unconventionality of its form.

Two leading members of this underground school are Mike Nichols and Elaine May, a cool couple who have hitherto confined their subversive activities to nightclubs and brief TV appearances. They have now come up for air at the John Golden in a full evening of satiric entertainment. The more sudsy atmosphere of the commercial theater does not seem to have rusted their barbs any, for they are currently contributing there an enormously intelligent program of animated aggression.

More than those of their fellow satirists, the techniques of Nichols and May are eminently adaptable to the theater, despite the intimate character of their work. The tradition they tap is Horatian rather than Juvenalian, which is to say they take their revenge on society by reproducing it instead of by whipping it with rods and scourges. The result is a hilarious imitation of a social action, only slightly exaggerated. In the manner of their less sophisticated mentor, Sid Caesar, they employ extraordinary powers of observation to locate the clichés of conventional middle-class life, transforming them into precise vignettes stripped down to their essential absurdity, so that the action tends to criticize itself. Miss May, a superb actress, brings enormous reality to a wide range of native female types, while Mr. Nichols, a superb comedian, provides the necessary grain of ironic comment without which the performance might seem too cruel or terrible. For Miss May is so accurate in her impersonations that she often threatens to break out of comedy altogether, a talent which is used with chilling effectiveness in a sketch called "Pirandello" (where both play upon the conditioned responses of the audience in a manner guaranteed to possess you with fear and excitement).

The rest of the evening is devoted to prepared sketches and an improvisation based on suggestions from the audience. The improvisation is the least impressive thing in the program since it only suggests the remarkable ingenuity of this team; the sketches demonstrate they have brilliance, irreverence, and wit as well. A wicked satire on PTA meetings introduces Miss May – equipped with black glasses, a formless dress, and a huge flower which keeps shedding its petals – to declare a week dedicated to art ("perhaps one of the best mediums of self-expression we have") and to describe the tribulations of the French Impressionist painters ("You know, Thank God for the Ford Foundation"), while Mr. Nichols, as a Southern playwright named Alabama Glass, shrilly outlines his latest play, a melodrama in which the heroine takes to "drink, prostitution, and putting on *airs!*" after her husband ("unjustly accused of *not* being a homosexual") has committed suicide. Along with these bitter buffooneries, we are treated to a skit on adultery in America, England, and France burlesquing the sexual peculiarities of each country; a sketch about name dropping in show business ("Bert Russell is not pushy . . . personally, I think a pushy philosopher is always a drag"); a telephone colloquy between a possessive Jewish mother and her son, an eminent rocket scientist reduced to infancy in the course of five agonizing minutes; and assorted blasts at vacuous teenagers, conformist suburban couples, Midwestern matinee ladies, mindless movie stars, and vulgar TV interviewers, not to mention a sampling of the countless lunacies with which America is now so abundantly provided.

Nichols and May, in short, are the voice of the outraged intelligence in a world given over to false piety, cloying sentiment, and institutionalized stupidity, and if this small voice can still be heard above the racket being produced all around us, then satire is still performing its traditional functions: to relieve that overwhelming sense of frustration, impotence, and isolation which afflicts the better spirits in our fatuous times.

Robert Brustein

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MOVIES

O Come, All Ye Faithful

We expect the extreme right or left to chant in unison as it goes through its daily mental calisthenics, but the liberal is supposed to examine each case on its merits. If he salivates every time he merely hears a phrase like "liberty of conscience," he is not so much a thinker as he is a conditioned reflex.

Stanley Kramer's new film *Inherit the Wind* assumes enough of us will salivate. The picture holds up some symbols and asks for disproportionate reac-

Inherit the Wind
(United Artists)

tions, like a radio-broadcast audience shown "Applause" signs. But the symbols are small and remote, the language tinny, and the whole work touched with smugness, an air of "You and I can tell the Good and the Bad People at once by the lingo they use."

The film is derived from the play of the same name which dramatized the famous Tennessee "Monkey Trial" of 1925. A schoolteacher is tried for breaking the state law by teaching Darwinism. The small-town trial becomes an international *cause célèbre*. The prosecution is conducted by Matthew Brady (William Jennings Bryan), the defender is Henry Drummond (Clarence Darrow). A character suggested by H. L. Mencken provides a caustic chorus. The teacher is convicted, though not before Drummond has excoriated intellectual oppression and Brady has literally given his life for fundamentalism.

But 35 years have passed and *multum* will no longer fit in this particular *parvo*. In its day this trial may have seemed an Armageddon of important and irreconcilable principles. No longer. The symbol is too small to represent for us Johannesburg and Budapest and Little Rock. The Monkey Trial is now a historical curiosity, and it can be made truly meaningful only by treating it as the farce that it was.

Far from farce, Kramer starts the film on a sententious note – with a tense spy-thriller sequence in which townsmen meet to arrest the teacher – and from then on he scarcely sets a foot right, stating everything with as ponderous a camera as possible. Technically the camera work is good, but its style is often inappropriate. For example, numerous scenes are shot past impressive foreground figures, irrelevant to the action, scenes which would have been better without all that hocus-focus.

The inflated earnestness of the film has affected even Frederic March, an actor who usually cuts sharply if flamboyantly to the bone. As Brady-Bryan he gives us a collection of mannerisms, not a human being: loose dentures, grimaces, belches. He has separated out the foolishness of Bryan from the whole man and thus leaves unsupported the lifelong affection of Drummond-Darrow for him. One can believe in Brady-Bryan as a mayor, perhaps a governor, but not as a three-time Presidential candidate. Only in his arrival speech does he suggest the silver-tongued idol of the masses.

Spencer Tracy, the Drummond, whose stock-in-trade has been young Tracy and mature Tracy, is now selling old Tracy, seamed and grizzled, slow-winking his way through the sunset years. He has become even more pronouncedly a soft-and-loud actor. He says "Yep" and "Nope" and is taciturnly wise; then he sticks out his jaw and bellows that all men are equal and men's minds must be free. It is enough to make an unregenerate snob of any man who thinks his mind *is* free.

Kramer seems to have a penchant for dancers who want to act, first Fred Astaire in *On the Beach*, now Paul Hartman (harmless, as a jailer) and Gene Kelly as the Mencken character. Divested of song and dance, Kelly is embarrassingly naked.

Like the Darrow character in *Compulsion*, Kramer's Darrow, too, covers all bets. At the end of the trial he pointedly picks up both his Darwin and a Bible. Meanwhile, even though victorious, Brady-Bryan has seemingly been unhinged by not being allowed to deliver a last oration, roars it out to an empty-

by Osborn

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ing court and kills himself in the *Prozess*.

I should judge that a true film of social comment is one that fills a conscientious viewer with shame – for things left undone. This film seems designed to make the liberal feel satisfied with his enlightened state. The chief entertainment it provides is in imagining what Darrow and Mencken would have thought of it. STANLEY KAUFFMANN

TELEVISION

A Can of Paint for Two

It has been estimated that the joint TV appearances by the Presidential candidates are costing the networks something like $2 million in lost revenues for prime viewing time. Now $2 million is a tidy sum, but assuming that at least 50 million Americans go to the polls on November 8, the broadcasters are passing up all of four cents per voter – so that we may compare our candidates in debate. Nor is $2 million a prohibitive percentage of network earnings. ABC's net earnings in 1959 were $7,967,000 – an increase of 49 percent over the previous year. Coming after the rigged shows, the poor shows, the payola scandals, conscience money at four cents per head is a small price for the broadcasters to pay to scrub up a dirty face.

But what of the debates themselves? We've seen enough to be sure there has been a pre-occupation with trivia, a slighting of matter for manner. So obsessed was ABC with insuring equal treatment to both candidates on the third debate that the producer insisted Kennedy's desk in a New York studio and Nixon's desk in Los Angeles be daubed with paint literally from the same can. (The can was flown across the country). To be consistent as well as ridiculous, the producer should have further required that the desks be constructed from wood cut from the same tree. Might the desks otherwise reflect light with some minute degree of difference, even though the paint was the same? (It was all love's labor lost anyway, since most of the shots were over their differences across the same closeups; the viewer hardly ever saw those desks!)

This predilection for how the debates *look* as a "show" rather than for full elucidation of the candidates' views amounts to a form of jamming that interferes with the exploration of issues.

There's some doubt too whether the avoidance of direct confrontation is an asset to the debates. Lincoln and Douglas climbed up on the same platform, took up positions toe to toe, and slugged it out. One hundred years later, the candidates are safely separated on stage sets exuding the sterile atmosphere of a hospital operating room. On the first program, Kennedy and Nixon were placed so far apart they couldn't have communicated with each other, except over TV. And way out in the limbo of an immense no-man's land was poor Howard K. Smith, through whom all the questions were channeled.

By the second debate, the candidates had moved somewhat closer together physically, at the same time moving farther apart ideologically. And the moderator was happily dispensed with as an intermediary in the question and answer routine. But this time the correspondents seemed to hang exotically from the ceiling somewhere.

The third debate, with Nixon speaking from California and Kennedy from New York, of course enforced a separation, though they seemed to be closer together. In the fourth encounter, Senator Kennedy did manage once or twice to convey the impression that he and Mr. Nixon were within shouting distance of each other. Once the camera caught him reacting spontaneously to some advice from his opponent – he almost laughed. And, at another point, he even raised his arm and *pointed* to the Vice President. Perhaps some day, the candidates will sit down and talk at the same table. At any rate the interlocutors ought to be dispensed with. The candidates know the issues, or should. Why not let them question each other?

The present format not only requires the questions to be raised by third parties, but it limits the responses to one statement by each of the candidates, thus almost assuring that no one can get to the heart of any issue. This was glaringly revealed on the third debate, when Kennedy and Nixon finally began going at each other over Quemoy and Matsu. Their exchange was abruptly cooled off by an irrelevant (at that instant) question about Mr. Truman's language.

By dismissing the panel of correspondents and letting the candidates quiz each other a question could be clarified more to the satisfaction of both parties (and the audience) before moving on to the next subject. Further, the very act of requiring the candidates themselves to put the questions would itself be revealing. Listening to the queries put by the candidates, the voters could better measure the men. Such a revised format would eliminate the need for the time clock, which now provides only equality of form, not of substance. If the candidates didn't have to keep a worried eye cocked on that inexorable sweeping second hand they could look with more concentration upon the issues. Moreover, if David Susskind can have two to three hours for *his* questions, mightn't the candidates be granted equivalent time on five shows every four years?

In presenting these debates, the broadcasters have only begun to discharge their obligation to operate in the public interest. They still have a long way to go. For instance, in what has been called the intellectual ghetto into which most of the egghead programming is crowded on Sundays, NBC and CBS are forcing the thinking audience to make an arbitrary choice between "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation," which at present are scheduled at the same hour. With the "great debates," TV is reaching the largest audience in history (estimated in some quarters at 70 million). Never before has such a large percentage of the American community been assembled for a public discussion of the great issues of the day. Why not do it more often – and in the 200-odd weeks between Presidential elections?

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Correspondence

The Man in the New Hampshire Jail

Sirs:

My heart was warmed by TRB's column (October 3) in which he had some fine things to say about "the most inoffensive man in sight" now spending a year in a New Hampshire jail.

At the end of ten months I have the same inner assurance that I did the only honorable thing possible in refusing to expose law-abiding Americans, meeting openly and peaceably in conference at World Fellowship, to harassment, public scorn, and even possibly prosecution and the loss of livelihood. This assurance is strengthened by the magnificent moral support of many leading daily papers, religious publications and organizations, liberal journals and multitudes of friends.

I appreciate TRB's reference to "some appropriate welcome" when I get out, December 14. One suggestion comes to me. I have been invited to be one of the speakers at the Emergency Civil Liberty Committee's Annual Dinner in celebration of the Bill of Rights at the Waldorf in New York, December 15. Dr. Linus Pauling and Mrs. Modjeska Simkins will also have a part in the program. We shall be glad to meet there all *New Republic* readers who can attend.

Willard Uphaus
Boscawen, N.H.

Protestants in Politics

Sirs:

In "Protestants in Politics," (September 14), you quote Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr as saying that J. Howard Pew "combines piety with right-wing Republicanism in a most remarkable way." If you use the quote so that your readers can conveniently classify Mr. Pew, it served its purpose, although not a very creditable one. If you felt, however, that the words of Dr. Niebuhr would somehow strengthen your thesis, you chose that support unwisely. Did you feel that Dr. Niebuhr's opinion belonged in the paper because of his experience on piety, on right-wing Republicanism, or on Mr. Pew?

The quotation raised a question in my mind that Dr. Niebuhr might like to answer: What political viewpoint is a pious person obligated to hold?

David A. Rykken
Manitowoc, Wisconsin

In reply:

There are many forms of piety, and there are rational and not so rational correlations between religious convictions and political commitments. Mr. Pew's political convictions follow logically from his form of piety, and I should not have used the word "remarkable" to describe the relation. His piety is the old individualistic Calvinism, which assumed that the private virtues of industry, honesty, and thrift made political policy in dealing with rising industry unnecessary. It ceased to be relevant to our life at about the turn of the century and is professed only by extremely wealthy Protestant Christians. Political policies ought to be judged in the context of our political life. Mr. Pew's opposition to Senator Kennedy on religious grounds is surely an object of just suspicion, since previous attitudes make it apparent that the opposition is motivated, not by religious but by economic and political convictions.

Reinhold Niebuhr
Union Theological Seminary
New York, N. Y.

Getlein's Private War

Sirs:

For some time, I have taken exception to Frank Getlein's private war with both *Art News* and some established styles of painting. His opinions are strong, but fail to convey anything more complex than tearing down one body of artistic output to build up another.

Mr. Getlein's central theme is the rehumanizing of art, and I would like to submit the hypothesis that to force-wed painting as he suggests to the "human situation" is as needlessly restrictive, despite its broad sound, as any declarations of the recent past. It is folly to urge painters to paint in any different way than they choose. This is the human situation. It is true that painters will again take up the human form, but it is unlikely that good painters will forsake the dynamic range and imaginative thrust of their Abstract or Expressionistic brothers.

William I. Barton
Concord, Mass.

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

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